The American Business Cycle: Continuity and Change by Benjamin M. Friedman
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The American Business Cycle: Continuity and Change





Chapter Title: Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
Chapter Author: Benjamin M. Friedman
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10028
Chapter pages in book: (p. 395 - 458)7 Money, Credit, and Interest
Rates in the Business Cycle
Benjamin M. Friedman
The monetary and financial aspects offluctuations in economic activity
have long attracted the attention ofeconomists and other observers of
the business cycle. Throughout the nineteenth century and into the
early years of the twentieth, business downturns in the United States
were typically associated in a quite obvious way with "panics" or
othersharp discontinuities in the financial markets. Such readily visible
events have all but vanished since the establishment of the Federal
Reserve System in 1914 and especially the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation in 1934, but the pace of activity in the financial markets
has continued to vary closely with that in many of the economy's
nonfinancial markets. Much of this covariation is by now highly fa-
miliar, if not necessarily well understood. The regularities on which
macroeconomists have focused most intensively in this context are
thoseinvolvingmoney (includingeitherhigh-powered money ordeposit
money), credit (including public debt, private debt, or the sum of the
two), and interest rates. l In large part because of the availability of
data extending back to the early years of this century, and in some
cases still earlier, the documentation of these regularities over fairly
long time periods is now broadly familiar.
One factor motivating the long history of interest in this subject is,
of course, simply the desire to understand more fully the underlying
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1. Stock prices have also attracted substantial attention in a business cycle context,
but less so than have money, credit, and interest rates.
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causes and internal dynamics ofbusiness fluctuations. Implications for
public policy have also been important in this regard, however. A
common thread running through decades ofliterature on the monetary
and financial aspects ofbusiness cycles has been the actual orpotential
role of monetary policy in affecting either real economic outcomes or
price stability, or both. Indeed, even those strands of literature that
have argued vigorously against the existence of any possibility that
monetary policy can improve real outcomes have heavily emphasized
the negative results to follow, typically via the speed or variability of
price inflation, from an ill-chosen (according to that view) policy regime.
The basic theme ofthis paper, in contrast to much ofthe extensive
literature of the subject to date, is that the quantitative relationships
connecting monetary and financial variables to the business cycle ex-
hibit few ifany strongly persistent regularities that have remained even
approximately invariant in the context ofthe widespread and, in some
instances, dramatic changes undergone by the United States financial
markets overfamiliar time periods both long and short. At a qualitative
level, ofcourse, broadly familiar regularities have characterized many
monetary and financial aspects ofUnited States business fluctuations.
The procyclical behavior of money, credit, and interest rates is well
known, as is the tendency of money and credit growth to "lead" real
economic growth at major business cycle turning points. Nevertheless,
these characteristic qualitative features of most business fluctuations
have not corresponded to persistent regularities in the quantitative
relationships that constitute the main focus of modern business cycle
analysis.
The finding that stable quantitative relationships to monetary and
financial variables have been absent from the United States business
cycle experiencedoes notmeanthatmonetaryandfinancial phenomena
are unimportant elements of business fluctuations, or that there is no
consistent basis for seeking to understand or explain them. The basic
monetary and financial elements ofeconomic behavior have no doubt
persisted in some fundamental sense. The problem is instead that these
basic elements of economic behavior do not correspond straightfor-
wardly in theory or closely in practice to the specific quantities that
economists can typically measure. In addition, the relevant behavior
is probably far too complex to be readily represented in simple linear
relationships limited to very few variables.
From the perspective of positive economics based on familiar and
available data, therefore, the main message ofthis paper is that simple
relationships usually taken to be central to monetary and financial
aspects of business cycles have in the past changed often and much.
From the perspective of inferences about monetary policy, the chief
implication is a warning against proceeding as ifanyone, or a few, of
these simple relationships will reliably remain immutable.397 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
Changes in the working of the United States financial markets that
are potentially important for monetary and financial aspects of busi-
ness fluctuations are not difficult to identify. Within the twentieth
century the entire apparatus and orientation ofUnited States monetary
policy have undergone several dramatic shifts. In addition to monetary
policy, major changes in government regulation and the expansion of
government intermediation have been potentially important and often
shifting influences. Moreover, the nation's private financial institutions
and practices have also undergone profound and far-reaching changes
over these years, partly in response to changing patterns of govern-
ment regulation and monetary policy, but also as a result of private
institutions' taking advantage of new developments elsewhere in the
economy.
Any attempt to see whether the monetary and financial aspects of
United States economic fluctuations have remained invariant, ornearly
so, in the face of these financial market changes must at the outset
confront the methodological choice between structural and reduced-
form approaches to this question. A structural framework imposes
potentially valuable restrictions on the way the corresponding empir-
ically estimated model summarizes the quantitative relationships ex-
hibited by the prior experience in question. Whatever analysis is
grounded in a specific structural model is therefore conditional onthose
restrictions. Restrictions that are valid reflections of actual economic
behavior will enable the model to extract the relevant behavioral re-
lationships from the available data more efficiently, but incorrect or
arbitrary restrictions will distort the representation of those relation-
ships. Either kind of error can introduce the appearance of change
where in fact there has been continuity, or of continuity where there
has been change.
The subject of monetary and financial influences on economic fluc-
tuations is not lacking for suggested structural frameworks. One long-
familiar strand of thinking along these lines, which has emphasized
interest rate, asset price, and credit rationing effects on specific kinds
of spending, is the expanded IS-LM aggregate demand model typical
ofthe post-Keynesian neoclassical synthesis, perhaps bestexemplified
empirically by the MIT-Penn-Social Science Research Council (MPS)
mode1. 2 A closely related line of structural analysis, which has placed
more emphasis on portfolio substitutions and asset valuations, is the
disaggregated asset market approach ofTobin (1961,1969) and ofBrun-
ner and Meltzer (1972, 1976). A third line of analysis, which in its
structural components is related to these two but has more narrowly
emphasized the role ofmonetary assets in affecting aggregate demand,
2. See, for example, de Leeuw and Gramlich 1968, 1969; Ando 1974; and Modigliani
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is the monetarist model of Friedman (1956, 1971), as exemplified em-
pirically by the Saint Louis mode1. 3 A more different line ofstructural
analysis is the rational expectations model of aggregate supply devel-
oped by Lucas (1972, 1973), and exemplified empirically by Sargent
(1976). A still more recent line ofanalysis has been the explicit banking
sector model of Fama (1980a, b).4 Moreover, each of these different
structural approaches essentially refers to a closed economy. To the
extent that the United States economy's increasing openness may also
be important for monetary and financial aspects of economic fluctua-
tions, the range of choice-and, consequently, of potential disagree-
ment-is only greater.
The approach taken in this paper is to sidestep the choice among,
orsynthesis of, these disparate structural models and to employ instead
only a reduced-form empirical approach that in principle is compatible
with any of them. The basic advantage in this approach is to avoid
making the analysis conditional on explicit structural restrictions that
would attract sharpdisagreementfrom the outset, andthatcouldindeed
be incorrect. The key disadvantages are the loss of efficiency in the
extraction ofthe relevant quantitative relationships from the data and,
correspondingly, the loss ofexplicit connection between the estimated
relationships and more specific elements of monetary and financial
behavior.
Section 7.1 sets the stage for the empirical analysis by briefly re-
viewing the major twentieth-century changes in the United States fi-
nancial markets that would make it surprising if there had been no
significant changes in the monetary and financial aspects of United
States economicfluctuations during this period-atleastunderthe view
that the prevailing institutions, includinggovernment structures as well
as private business practices, importantly affect economic behavior.
Section7.2 documents ata qualitativelevelthefamiliar interrelatedness
of money, credit, interest rates, and nonfinancial economic activity in
a business cycle context, but it then goes on to point out some changes
in these relationships over time that are apparent even at a very simple
level of analysis. Section 7.3 digresses to consider the relationships
connecting money, credit, and their respective''velocities" to the fluc-
tuations ofboth nominal and real income during the economy's seven
and one-half recognized business cycles since World War II. Section
7.4 applies formal time series and frequency domain methods to ex-
amine at a quantitative level, and in an explicitly dynamic context, the
3. See, for example, Anderson and Jordan 1968 and Anderson and Carlson 1970. These
models are really reduced-form in spirit, however. See Jonson 1976 for an example of
an attempt at a more structural rendering of the same ideas.
4. Empirical work to date among these lines has mostly adopted a reduced-form
approach. See, for example, King and Plosser 1981.399 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
familiar relationships introduced in section7.2. Section7.5 pursues this
line of analysis further, to determine whether differences in these fa-
miliar relationships from one time period to another are significant not
justin a statistical sense buteconomically as well. Section 7.6 digresses
again to consider the postwar evidence on the economy's "credit cycle."
Section 7.7 concludes by summarizing the principal empirical findings
presented throughout the paper.
7.1 Changes in the United States Economy's Financial Structure
Whether or not the monetary and financial aspects ofeconomic fluc-
tuations in the United States have changed their character over any
specific period oftime-within the twentieth century, for example, or
since World War II, orsinceOctober1979-isanempirical issue. Before
examining the evidence on this question, however, it is appropriate to
ask whether during the relevant time period there have been changes
in the economy's underlying financial structure that, at least in prin-
ciple, could have effected changes in the cyclical relationships between
monetary and financial variables and nonfinancial economy activity.
Three broad categories of changes in the United States economy's
financial structure stand out in this regard.
First, within the time period spanned by available data (and studied
in this paper), the entire apparatus and orientation of United States
monetary policy have undergone dramatic shifts. Before 1914 the United
States had no central bank as such but relied instead on a largely
unregulated national banking system anchored by a gold standard.5
Prompted by a recurrent series offinancial crises and panics, especially
in 1901, 1907, and 1913, Congress created a new Federal Reserve Sys-
tem charged with the basic task ofpreserving stability in the financial
markets-morespecifically, instructed''tofurnish an elastic currency."
The macroeconomic objectives almost· universally associated with
monetary policy in the post-World War II era, including especially the
objective ofprice stability, received no mention in the original Federal
Reserve Act.
Between 1914 and World War II, monetary policy evolved in a variety
of ways, as Federal Reserve decision makers gradually came to un-
derstand what effects the system's open market purchases and sales
5. Much earlier on the Bank ofthe United States had constituted a rudimentary form
ofcentral bank, but it passed out ofexistence when Andrew Jackson declined to renew
its charter in 1832. From then until the passage of the National Banking Act in 1864,
privatecommercialbanks were charteredexclusivelybytheindividualstates. Thereafter,
until 1914, federally chartered banks enjoyed a monopoly over the note-issuing power
but continued (as they do today) to share other banking functions, like deposit taking,
with state-chartered banks.400 Benjamin M. Friedman
of government securities had in the new world of fractional reserve
banking directly based on central bank liabilities. The establishment in
1923 of what subsequently evolved into today's Federal Open Market
Committee led temporarily to an increasing emphasis on open market
operations in a monetary policy context, butin the 1930s the confusions
of the depression and the associated international monetary crisis, in-
cluding the abandonment of the gold standard in 1934, arrested the
development of the monetary policy mechanism. Then, during World
War II and thereafter until 1951, this evolution effectively ceased as
the Federal Reserve assumed an obligation to support the open market
price of the government's outstanding debt (which was then almost
entirely a war loan).
In 1951 the Treasury/Federal Reserve Accord relieved the central
bank of this obligation, and monetary policy assumed the quasi-
independent macroeconomic role it has played ever since. Even so,
there have been several major changes in monetary policy orientation
and procedures since then. In the early post-Accord years, the Federal
Reserve keyed its operations to the net free reserve position of the
commercial banking system. Bythe late 1960s the principalpolicyfocus
had changed to setting interest rates on short-term debt instruments,
sometimes treasury bills and lateronfederal funds. From 1970 onward,
quantity targets for the growth of various aggregative measures of
money and credit, including especially the narrowly defined money
stock (Ml), played a generally increasing albeit sporadic role in the
formulation andimplementationofmonetarypolicy. In 1979 the Federal
Reserve announced a renewed emphasis on these quantity growth tar-
gets and adopted new operating procedures for achieving them, based
on the growth rate of nonborrowed bank reserves. In 1982 the M1
target was publicly suspended, however, and the weight placed oneven
the broader money and credit targets in 1982 and 1983 was uncertain.
At present, the role of quantity growth targets in United States mon-
etary policy may be central, irrelevant, or more likely, somewhere in
between.
Second, the often shifting evolution of monetary policy has hardly
been the only way actions of the federal government (not to mention
those of state governments) have effected structural changes that may
well have altered, perhaps importantly, how the economy's financial
and nonfinancial markets interact in a business cycle context.6 Gov-
ernment regulatory actions have also been a potentially important and
often changing influence. The three most dramatic changes-the in-
6. The discussion that follows focuses narrowly on the financial markets and therefore
omits such important elements ofthe changing role ofgovernment as taxes, government
spending, bankruptcy arrangements, and so on-all of which could importantly affect
the relationships between monetary and financial varibles and levels ofeconomic activity.401 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
surance ofprivate bank deposits, the prohibition ofinterest on demand
deposits, and the separation ofthe commercial banking and securities
industries-all took effect in the 1930s. Further potentially important
changes in bank regulation and supervision have occurred from time
to time since then, including most prominently the key legislation gov-
erning bank holding companies in the late 1960s and the deregulation
ofbanks and otherdepository institutions in the early 1980s. Moreover,
in severalfurthercomplete turns ofthe wheel, the prohibitionofinterest
on demand deposits has become effectively inoperative within the past
decade, and long-standing prohibitions on interstate banking and on
banking firms engaging in the securities business (and vice versa) are
even now becoming fictional. Perhaps most important, in recent years
the entire distinction between transactions balances and savings bal-
ances has become blurred to the point of meaninglessness.
Changes in government financial regulation have also extended well
beyond the banking system and other depository institutions. The se-
curities legislation ofthe 1930s created a \\lhole separate industry, and
subsequent regulation has continued to affect how it works. Key reg-
ulatory changes effected by the Securities and Exchange Commission
have ranged from requiring competitive bidding in most public utility
company underwritings beginning in the 1950s, to allowing the spread
of open-end mutual funds beginning in the 1960s, to prohibiting fixed
minimum commissions on stock exchange brokerage beginning in the
1970s, to permitting "shelf" offerings ofcorporate securities beginning
in the 1980s. As a result of these and many other regulatory actions
over the years, the securities markets in the United States function
differently today than they did in earlier times.
The National Banking Act of 1933 introduced deposit interest rate
ceilings, in part as a response to banks' alleged overaggressive bidding
for interbank demand deposits during the 1920s. The ceilings have also
applied to time and savings deposits, however, and in this context they
have at times had enormous impact on the workings of the financial
markets and on the financing of economic activity. Specific episodes
of disintermediation during the 1960s and 1970s, owing to regulation
Qceiling rates thatremainedlow in comparison to sharply rising market
interestrates, led to the rise ofwhole new patternsofportfolio behavior
and to periodic depression in the homebuilding industry. The Federal
Reserve System first moved to eliminate these adverse effects in 1970
by suspendingthe ceiling oninterestpaid onmostlarge bankcertificates
ofdeposit. As ofthis time, these ceilings appear to be on the way out
altogether as a result of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980.
A related development in the government's role in the credit market,
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posit interest ceilings, has been the great increase in government in-
termediation. The Federal Home Loan Bank System and the Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank began operations before World War II, but
the scale of their activity was small at first, and their initial focus was
on agricultural credit. The Federal National Mortgage Association be-
gan its lending operations in 1955. Only in the 1960s and 1970s, how-
ever, as periodic disintermediation became severe, did the scope and
size of government financial intermediation expand greatly. In recent
years the government-sponsored credit agencies have been joined by
pools issuing mortgage-backed securities that are not only government
sponsored but in some cases formally guaranteed. As ofthe late 1960s,
and as recently as 1982, it was not atypical for these quasi-government
institutions to account for half or more of all home mortgage lending
in the United States in high disintermediation years. Moreover, in re-
cent years the federal government has extended its direct loan and loan
guarantee operations far beyond housing- and agriculture-related cred-
its, to the benefit of such diverse borrowers as college students, New
York City, and the Lockheed and Chrysler corporations.
Third, the nation's private financial institutions and practices have
undergone profound and far-reaching changes over these years, partly
in response to changing patterns of government regulation and mon-
etary policy but also in large part as a result ofprivate initiatives taking
advantage of new developments elsewhere in the economy, including
especially the rapidly changing technology ofcommunications and data
processing. New forms of deposits (for example, negotiable time cer-
tificates, Eurodollar credits, and money market deposit accounts) and
new securities (for example, variable rate mortgages, floating rate notes,
interest rate futures, and listed stock options) have come and in some
cases gone. So have new kinds of financial institutions (for example,
money market mutual funds and mortgage pass-through pools).
Other forms ofchange in private financial practices have been more
gradual, but potentially just as important. The nation's financial mar-
kets have steadily become less segmented and presumably more effi-
cient in the classic sense. Diverse regional markets have become more
integrated, though they are still far from entirely so, and barriers sep-
arating different kinds ofborrowers from different kinds ofdepositors
orlenders have steadily eroded. Meanwhile, some institutions like pen-
sionfunds and credit unions have grown rapidly in relative terms, while
others like insurance companies and mutual savings banks have done
the opposite. In a further series of developments of potentially very
great importance for the questions at issue here, the United States
financial markets as a whole have at times become less open to foreign
participation, and more recently more so, as capital controls have come
and gone, while most (though not all) foreign markets have become403 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
more accessible from here. Indeed, during large parts of the period
under study in this paper, many key foreign currencies simply were
not convertible.
Although adequately summarizing the elements of these private fi-
nancial market changes that are of greatest potential importance in a
business cycle context is probably impossible in the space available
here, several basic trends that are relevant in this context stand out.
One is that transactions costs have fallen, irregularly but persistently
nonetheless, over the period under study in this paper. Another is that
financial assets have increasingly become negotiable, and those that
have always been negotiable have become more liquid. A third is that,
despite the potentially very important episodes ofretrogression, finan-
cial markets around the world have in fact become more closely
integrated.
Inlight ofthese changesin the role ofmonetarypolicy, in government
regulations and intermediation, and in private financial institutions and
practices, it would be astonishing if there had been no changes at all
in the relationships connecting money, credit, and interest rates to
United States economic fluctuations. In the contextofbusiness cycles,
however, as opposed to a study offinancial markets per se, what mat-
ters is whether these (or still other) changes have brought about sig-
nificant, and economically important, changes in such relationships at
the macroeconomic level.
7.2 Basic Cyclical Relationships in Monetary and Financial Data
The four panels offigure 7.1 give an overview ofthe basic relation-
ships of four key monetary and financial variables to United States
economic fluctuations by showing these variables' annual variation
from either 1891 or 1919 to 1982. The figure does not explicitly include
any measure of nonfinancial economic activity, but the conventional
shadings indicate business contractions as designated by the NBER.
The top panel of the figure shows the annual percentage change in
the money stock, measured both by the Friedman/Schwartz "old M2"
concept for 1891-1975 and by the "new Ml" concept for 1919-82.
The "old M2" measure includes currency held by the public plus "ad-
justed" total deposits at commercial banks but not at nonbank depos-
itory institutions (and also, since 1961, excluding large certificates of
deposit).? The "new Ml" measure is that adopted in 1980 (as
"MI-B") by the Federal Reserve System, including currency held by
7. The underying data are annual averages centered on 30 June. From 1890 to 1907 the
annual data are averages ofquarterly figures. From 1908 to 1945 they are averages ofend-
of-month data. From 1947 to 1975 they are averages of daily-average monthly data.404 Benjamin M. Friedman
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the public plus all checkable deposits other than those held by foreign
commercial banks and official institutions, and as amended in 1982 to
include traveler's checks.8 As is well knownfrom the workofFriedman
and Schwartz (1963a, 1970, 1982) and others, the major historical fluc-
tuations in United States nonfinancial economic activity have been
accompanied by often sharp fluctuations in the rate ofmoney growth.
Prominent examples that stand out in the figure include the episodes
ofnegative money growth in 1921,1931, and 1949 and the sharp slowing
of money growth in 1938. Especially during the post-World War II
period, however, fluctuations in economic activity and variations in
money growth have both been more modest. The comovement ofmoney
growth and real economic growth has been less pronounced also, though
it is still readily visible.
The second panel offigure 7.1 shows the annual percentage change
in domestic nonfinancial credit, including the total outstanding credit
market indebtedness of all United States public and private sector
borrowers other than financial intermediaries.9 As is documented in
Friedman (1981, 1983b), domestic nonfinancial credit has also borne a
close relationship to United States nonfinancial economic activity, es-
pecially in the postwar period. Even before World War II, however,
several major episodes of reduced credit growth, including those in
1921, 1931, and 1938, stand out as having occurred in conjunction with
recognized economic fluctuations.
The bottom two panels offigure 7.1 show the annual average levels
ofinterest rates on prime four- to six-month commercial paper offered
in New York, and on Baa-rated corporate bonds, respectively.lo The
main features that stand out immediately in the interest rate data are
the great volatility ofboth short- and long-term rates before 1930 and
after 1970, the extraordinarily low level of both rates during the late
1930s and early 1940s, and the persistent upward trend since World
War II. As is thoroughly familiar, however, interest rates also fluctuate
cyclically, and many ofthe recognized business cycle episodes during
this period also coincide with readily visible interest rate movements.
Table 7.1 focuses more closely on the comovements ofboth the M1
money stock and domestic nonfinancial credit with economic activity
by arranging seasonally adjusted quarterly data in the context of the
seven and one-half complete episodes since World War II designated
as contractions and expansions by the NBER.ll For each designated
8. The underlying data, constructed for this paper, are annual averages of monthly
data, including end-of-month data through 1946 and daily-average data since 1947. (The
Federal Reserve has constructed the official new MI series back only to 1959.)
9. The underlying data are end-of-year data. The domestic nonfinancial credit concept
is roughly analogous to "primary securities" in the sense of Gurley and Shaw 1960.
10. The data are annual averages of daily-average monthly data.
11. The expansion ending in 1948:4 officially began in 1945:4, but the analysis here
and below excludes it so as to avoid any remaining effects due to the wartime economy.406 Benjamin M. Friedman
Table 7.1 Postwar Cyclical Movements of Money and Credit
Average Growth Rate of Average Growth Rate of
Business Cycles Money (Ml) Credit
































Mean for all 3.08% 6.86%
contractions
Mean for all 4.76% 8.21%
expansions
Note: Values shown are in percent per annum.
contractionorexpansion, thetable showstheaverageperannumgrowth
rate of money and credit, respectively.12 Despite the secular postwar
trend toward faster growth of money and credit, the strongly cyclical
aspect of both money growth and credit growth stands out clearly in
12. The table excludes credit growth for the first contraction and expansion because
quarterly credit data are available only from 1952:1 onward.407 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
these summarydata. Money growthin expansions has exceededmoney
growth in contractions by 1.68% per annum on average, while credit
growth in expansions has exceeded credit growth in contractions by
1.35%perannumonaverage. Thebasiccyclicalregularityis muchmore
strikingthantheseaveragedifferences suggest, however. Moneygrowth
in eachexpansionwas faster thanin the precedingcontraction, and money
growth w~s slowerin eachcontractionthanin the preceding expansion.
Similarly, creditgrowthin eachexpansion was fasterthancreditgrowth
in the preceding contraction, and creditgrowth in eachcontraction was
slower than in the preceding expansion.
Table 7.2 presents analogous data (not seasonally adjusted) for the
postwarcyclical levels and movements ofshort- and long-term interest
rates. Once again a secular postwar trend, toward higher interest rates
and larger (absolute) interest rate changes, stands out immediately.
Interest rates have also exhibited strong cyclical regularities, but they
are not so striking as in the case ofmoney and credit growth. Interest
rate levels have been lowerin expansions than in contractions by about
0.75% on average, but there has hardly been uniformity in this respect.
In only two expansions were short-term interest rates lower than in
the previous contraction, and in only one expansion was the long-term
rate lower (by more than a single basis point).!3
By contrast, the chiefcyclical regularity that does stand out in table
7.2 is the rise of the short-term interest rate in every expansion and
the corresponding decline in every contraction. The 6.72% (algebraic)
difference between the average short-term rate change in expansions
and in contractions, respectively, dwarfs the small difference in the
corresponding average levels. The long-term interest rate has also risen
in all seven postwar expansions and declined in six of the eight con-
tractions, though here the (algebraic) difference for the respective av-
erage changes has been much smaller, as most familiar theories ofthe
pricing oflong-term versus short-term assets would imply.
In summary, both the ~nnual data plotted in figure 7.1 and the cycle-
specific averages ofquarterly data shown in tables 7.1 and 7.2 give the
impression of strong and persistent regularities in the monetary and
financial aspects of United States economic fluctuations. On closer
inspection, however, many of these regularities turn out not to be so
regular or so persistent after all. Although the investigation of these
relationships in a dynamic context is the subject of sections 7.4 and
7.5 below, table 7.3 provides a quick overview by showing simple
correlation coefficients relating the annual movements ofthe monetary
13. It is at first tempting to suggest that, given the upward secular trend, the lower
average levels for expansions are simply due to the omission ofthe expansion that began
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and financial variables plotted in figure 7.1 to the annual percentage
change in real gross national product.14 For the monetary and credit
aggregates, the table also shows analogous correlations for the corre-
sponding aggregates deflated by the gross national product price
deflator.
To highlight changes in these relationships over time, table 7.3 pre-
sents correlation coefficients separately for the pre-World War I (1891-
1916), interwar (1919-40), and post-World War II (1947-82) periods,
and also for two subperiods (1947-65 and 1966-82) within the postwar
period. Especially from the perspective ofchanges in monetary policy,
other possible breaks in the postwar period would also be logical,
including 1951 when the Treasury/Federal Reserve Accord took effect,
1970 when the Federal Reserve System first began to employ explicit
monetary aggregate targets and also first began to suspend regulation
Q ceilings, and 1979 when the Federal Reserve (temporarily) adopted
new operating procedures. The break at 1966 roughly separates the
early postwar years oflow price inflation, stable real economic growth,
and few apparent "supply shocks" from the subsequent years ofrapid
and accelerating price inflation, less stable and on average slower real
growth, and occasional large supply-side disturbances.
Foreach monetary or financial variable among the eight considered,
and for each separate time period, table 7.3 reports the simple corre-
lation of the variable's annual percentage change (for interest rates,
the absolute change) with the annual percentage change of real gross
national productforthree lead/lag relationships: first with the monetary
or financial variable leading real growth by one year, next contempor-
aneously, and last with that variable lagging real growth by one year.
In contrast to the appearance of strong regularities in figure 7.1 and
in tables 7.1 and 7.2, the dominant impression given by these corre-
lations is the absence of systematic relationships that have persisted
across the different time periods under consideration. 15 The only two
consistently significantrelationships arethe tendencyofreal M2 growth
to be rapid (slow) contemporaneously with rapid (slow) real growth,
and of long-term interest rates to fall (rise) in the year before a year
ofrapid (slow) real growth. Nominal Ml growth was strongly positively
correlated with contemporaneous real growth during the interwar pe-
riod, but less so during either half of the postwar period considered
separately and not at all for the postwarperiod overall. Real Ml growth
14. From 1929 to 1982 the underlying GNP data are the standard national income and
product accounts (NIPA) estimates. From 1909 to 1928 the data are United States De-
partment of Commerce estimates, which (in principle) are analogous to the subsequent
NIPA estimates at the aggregate level. From 1890 to 1908 the data are Department of
Commerce estimates based on Kendrick 1961.
15. In addition, because the underlying variables are serially correlated, the conven-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.411 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
was strongly correlated with contemporaneous real economic growth
earlier on, but not during the later postwar period. Neither nominal
nor real M1 growth has shown a significant lead or lag relationship to
real economic growth on an annual basis. Nominal M2 growth was
strongly positivelycorrelatedwith contemporaneousrealgrowthduring
the prewar and interwar periods, but not since World War II.
NominalcreditgrowthresemblesnominalM1growthinbeingstrongly
positively correlated with contemporaneous real economic growth dur-
ing the interwar period and the early postwar period, but not for the
later postwar period or for the postwar period as a whole. For the in-
terwar and early postwar periods, lagged credit growth has been sig-
nificantly correlated with real economic growth, although positively in
theformeryears andnegativelyin thelatter. Real creditgrowthhas been
positively correlated with real economic growth on a contemporaneous
basis throughout the postwar period, but it was not so earlier on.
Finally, both short- and long-term interest rate changes have been
negatively correlatedwith contemporaneousreal economicgrowth, and
(except for short-term rates in the interwar period) with the following
year's real growth, throughout the period under study here. Many of
these correlations are not significant, however. The contemporaneous
relationship for short-term rates is significant except for the interwar
years, and for long-term rates it is so except for the early postwar
period. The change in short-term rates has been positively correlated
with the prior year's real growth, but significantly so only during the
prewar and early postwar periods.
Simple correlations based on annual data are a crude way of sum-
marizing economic relationships, ofcourse, even when they allow for
modest leads or lags. Nevertheless, ifthe regularities connecting mon-
etary and financial variables to business cycles were sufficiently pow-
erful a~ld persistent, they would be likely to show up more strongly
even in these simple correlations. That they do not is hardly the end
ofthe story, but the fact that it is necessary to look harder in order to
find them is itself suggestiv~.
7.3 Money, Credit, and "Velocity" in Postwar Business Cycles
A subject that has run throughout the long-standing literature of
monetary and financial aspects ofeconomic fluctuations is the respec-
tive roles in this context of money (or credit) and the associated "ve-
locity" defined simply as the ratio of nominal income to money (or,
again, to credit). Before examining the United States experience in this
regard, it is useful to point out the absence of any economic meaning
of "velocity" as so defined-other than, by definition, the income-to-412 Benjamin M. Friedman
money ratio. Becausethe "velocity"label may seemtoconnotedeposit
or currency turnover rates, there is often a tendency to infer that
"velocity" defined in this way does in fact correspond to some physical
aspectofeconomic behavior. When the numeratorofthe ratio is income
rather than transactions or bank debits, however, "velocity" is simply
a numerical ratio. 16
As table 7.1 shows for the postwar period, both money and credit
grow faster on average during economic expansions than during con-
tractions. The issue of money or credit movements versus their re-
spective "velocities," in a business cycle context, isjustthe distinction
between movements ofnominal income that match movements ofmoney
or credit and movements ofincome that do not, and hence that imply
movements in the income-to-money or income-to-credit ratio.
Table 7.4, using quarterly data for postwar cyclical episodes exactly
analogous to the money and credit growth averages in table 7.1, shows
that the "velocity" associated with each aggregate has also exhibited
strongcyclical properties. Monetary velocity, which has had an upward
seculartrendsince World War II, has risenonaveragein eachexpansion
and has declined on average in six ofeight contractions. The average
growth of monetary velocity in expansions has exceeded that in con-
tractions by4.76% perannum, a muchgreaterdifference thanthe 1.68%
per annum shown in table 7.1 for money growth itself. Credit velocity,
which has been trendless on average since World War II, has risen on
average in four of six expansions and declined on average in each
contraction. The average growth of credit velocity in expansions has
exceeded thatin contractions by 4.31% perannum, again a much larger
difference than the 1.35% per annum difference shown in table 7.1 for
credit growth.
Because the numerator of the "velocity" ratio is nominal income,
while business cycle expansions and contractions typically refer to
fluctuations ofreal economic activity, it is difficult to go much further
in considering money, credit, and their respective "velocities" in a
business cycle context without allowing for cyclical variation in price
inflation. As table 7.5 shows, however, during the postwarperiod price
inflation has apparently followed the business cycle with a sufficient
lag that the movements of real and nominal gross national product
during expansions and contractions have almost exactly corresponded
on average. Real income, of course, has grown on average in each
expansion and declined on average in each contraction, with an (al-
gebraic) difference of5.83% per annum between the mean for all ex-
pansions and the mean for all contractions. By contrast, because of
16. See Cramer 1983, for example, for evidence on the different respective movements
of income and total transactions.413 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
Table 7.4 Postwar Cyclical Movements of Money and Credit "Velocities"
Average Growth Rate Average Growth Rate
Business Cycles of Money "Velocity" of Credit "Velocity"
































Mean for all -0.68% -3.78%
contractions
Mean for all 4.08% 0.53%
expansions
Note: Values shown are in percent per annum.
the upward secular trend in price inflation, nominal income declined
in the first three postwar contractions but increased in the subsequent
five. Even so, the difference between the average growth of nominal
income in expansions and contractions, respectively, has been 6.44%
per annum-almost identical to the corresponding difference for real
income. At least for averages across business cycle expansions and
contractions, therefore, relationships to nominal income (like those414 Benjamin M. Friedman
18ble 7.5 Postwar CycUcal Movements of Real and Nominal Income
Business Cycles
Average Growth Rate Average Growth Rate
of Real income of Nominal Income
































Mean for all -1.48% 2.40%
contractions
Mean for all 4.35% 8.84%
expansions
Note: Values shown are in percent per annum.
based on "velocity" ratios) approximately carryover to relationships
to real income, and hence to economic fluctuations in the ordinary
business cycle sense. Table 7.6 summarizes these relationships by col-
lecting the means from tables 7.1, 7.4, and 7.5 and the corresponding
implied means ofprice inflation. 17
17. The reason for calculating the relationships among the nonfinancial variables a
second time in the lower half of the table is that quarterly credit data are not available
for the first postwar contraction and expansion. The same point applies to table 7.7.415 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
table 7.6 Cyclical Means for Income, Money, Credit, and "Velocity"
1948:4 to 1982:4
Variable Eight Contractions Seven Expansions Difference
Mean X -1.48% 4.35% 5.83%
Mean Y 2.40 8.84 6.44
-Mean P -3.89 -4.51 -.62
Mean Y 2.40% 8.84% 6.44%
MeanM 3.08 4.76 1.68
Mean Vm -.68 4.08 4.76
1953:2 to 1982:4
Variable SevenContractions Six Expansions Difference
Mean X -1.64% 4.02% 5.66%
Mean Y 3.08 8.74 5.66
-Mean P -4.72 -4.72 .00
Mean Y 3.08% 8.74% 5.66%
MeanC 6.86 8.21 1.35
Mean Vc -3.78 .53 4.31
Note: Values are in percentperannum; detail may not add to totals because ofrounding.
Definitions ofvariable symbols:
X = growth rate ofreal GNP;
Y = growth rate ofnominal GNP;
P = growth rate ofGNP price deflator;
M = growth rate of MI money stock;
Vm = growth rate of YIM;
C = growth rate ofdomestic nonfinancial credit;
Vc = growth rate of Y/C.
Table 7.7 pursues further the distinction ofmoney and credit growth
versus "velocity" growth by showing an analysis of variance for the
respective real and nominal income identities summarized in terms of
means in table 7.6. The upper half of the table first decomposes the
variation ofreal income growth into components representing nominal
growth, price inflation, and their covariance and then decomposes the
variation ofnominal income growth into components representing money
growth, "velocity" growth (that is, nominal income growth that does
not correspond to money growth), and the associated covariance term.
The first column of the table applies this decomposition only to
contractions, treating each one as a simple observation-in other
words, asking what role money growth, "velocity" growth, and price
inflation have played in accounting for differences between one busi-
ness contraction and another. The average (negative) real growth rate
has varied little among successive contraction episodes, so that the
differences here are almost entirely differences among respective
contractions' rates of price inflation and hence of nominal growth.416 Benjamin M. Friedman
Table 7.7 Cyclical Variance Decompositions for Money, Credit, and
"Velocity"
1948:4 to 1982:4
Variable Eight Contractions Seven Expansions Fifteen Periods
Var (X) .89 1.03 9.96
Var (Y) 13.38 5.17 19.96
Var (P) 17.66 6.56 11.74
-2 cov (Y, P) -30.15 -10.70 -21.76
Var (Y) 13.38 5.17 19.96
Var (M) 8.04 5.64 7.18
Var (Vm) 2.30 .79 7.52
+2 cov (M, Vm) 3.04 -1.26 5.25
1953:2 to 1982:4
Variable Seven Contractions Six Expansions Thirteen Periods
Var (X) .81 .30 9.14
Var (Y) 11.28 6.11 16.80
Var (P) 14.04 7.42 10.11
-2 cov (Y, P) -24.51 -13.23 -17.77
Var (Y) 11.28 6.11 16.80
Var (C) 3.22 4.20 3.85
Var (Ve) 3.42 1.31 7.25
+2 cov (C, Ve) 4.64 .60 5.70
Note: Values are in percent per annum squared. See table 7.6 for definitions of variable
symbols.
The results show that money growth variations have dominated ve-
locity growth variations in accounting for these differences. Analo-
gous results presented in the second column show an even greater
predominance of money growth variations over velocity growth vari-
ations in accounting for nominal income growth differences across
expansions. The final column of the table presents the results of an
analogous decomposition applied to all contractions and all expan-
sions, again treating each as a single observation-in other words,
asking what role money growth, velocity growth, and price inflation
have played in accounting for differences not just among contrac-
tions or among expansions but also between contractions and expan-
sions. In this context the respective variations of money growth and
velocity growth have been more nearly coequal, and also impor-
tantly correlated.
The lower half of table 7.7 presents the analogous three sets of
decompositions including credit and credit "velocity." The results are
similar to those for money and money velocity shown above, but in417 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
each case with a smaller role for the aggregate, and consequently a
greaterrole for velocity. Variations in creditgrowth have predominated
over velocity growth variations only in accounting for differences among
expansions. For differences among contractions, the two have been
approximately coequal and importantly correlated. Variations in credit
velocity, and its correlation with credit growth variations, have been
more important than variations in credit growth per se in the broader
cyclical context ofaccounting also for differences between expansions
and contractions.
7.4 Dynamic Relationships
Simple annual correlations like those shown in table 7.3 fail to
convey what it is important to know about the comovement of
economic time series in a business cycle context for at least three
reasons. First, the relevant lead/lag relationships may be distributed
over either more or less than one year. The work of Friedman and
Schwartz (1963a), for example, concluded that variations in money
growth typically lead variations in income growth by less than a
year. Second, even highly significant lead correlations may merely
reflect the interaction of contemporaneous (or even lagged) relation-
ships among time series that are individually autocorrelated. In con-
trast to the propositions that characterized much of the earlier litera-
ture on monetary and financial aspects of economic fluctuations,
which typically referred simply to the comovement among two or
more variables, the modern analysis of business cycles focuses in-
stead on whether movements in one variable are systematically re-
lated to those parts of the movements in another that are not purely
autoregressive. Third, the relationship of one variable to another
may depend on what further variables the analysis includes. The
proposition that two variables exhibit a stable relationship to one
another without allowance for further variables implies either that
other variables are unimportant to that relationship or that whatever
other variables are relevant have not varied (will not vary) signifi-
cantly during the period under study. The results presented in this
section of the paper extend the simple overview provided in table
7.3 so as to take account of each of these potentially important
considerations.
Table 7.8 presents F-statistics for conventional exogeneity ('''cau-
sality") tests of bivariate annual relationships connecting nominal in-
come growth respectively to the growth ofMl, M2, and credit, and the
change in short- and long-term interest rates, for the same time periods
used in table 7.1. Table 7.9 presents analogous results for bivariate re-418 Benjamin M. Friedman
Table 7.8 Summary of Bivariate Annual Relationships: Financial Variables
and Nominal Income
Variable 1891-1916 1919-40 1947-82 1947-65 1966-82
Equation for Y
F(Y) 0.21 1.97 1.21 1.20
F (Ml) 1.39 6.87*** 6.38** 0.32
Equation for M1
F(Y) 1.13 1.64 0.93 0.17
F(Ml) 4.77** 13.77*** 2.83* 4.10**
Equation for Y
F(Y) 4.01** 0.08 1.68
F(M2) 4.07** 1.01 0.19
Equation for M2
F(Y) 2.11 0.54 1.11
F(M2) 3.29* 2.20 1.38
Equation for Y
F(Y) 0.16 2.12 0.64 5.82**
F(C) 3.14* 9.83*** 0.40 11.18***
Equation for C
F(Y) 0.03 18.21*** 18.17*** 1.98
F(C) 1.08 64.11*** 2.59 11.89***
Equation for Y
F(Y) 0.34 2.92* 0.28 1.01 5.75**
F (Rs) 4.09** 1.42 1.03 0.67 8.82***
Equation for Rs
F(Y) 1.70 0.88 0.51 0.21 0.77
F (Rs) 9.86*** 0.95 4.29** 3.38* 1.88
Equation for Y
F(Y) 0.15 0.09 1.12 0.37
F (Rl) 6.23** 0.31 4.32** 1.91
Equation for Rl
F(Y) 0.18 1.48 0.06 1.48
F (Rl) 1.27 8.49*** 0.23 1.71
Note: Values shown are F-statistics.
Definitions of variable symbols:
Y = growth rate of nominal GNP;
M = growth rate of money stock (M1 or M2);
C = growth rate ofdomestic nonfinancial credit;
Rs = change in prime commercial paper rate;
Rl = change in Baa bond rate.
Significance levels:
*Significant at .10 level.
**Significant at .05 level.
***Significant at .01 level.419 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
Table 7.9 Summary of Bivariate Annual Relationships: Financial V~riables
and Real Income
Variable 1891-1916 1919-40 1947-82 1947-65 1966-82
Equation for X
F(X) 0.14 0.85 1.69 0.17
F(Ml) 0.19 7.73*** 5.57** 2.42
Equation for Ml
F(X) 0.19 2.39 4.20** 0.74
F(Ml) 2.53 22.57*** 4.40** 1.10
Equation for X
F(X) 2.56 0.78 0.47
F(M2) 0.70 0.06 2.40
Equation for M2
F(X) 5.12** 0.64 3.48*
F(M2) 5.53** 1.91 4.98**
Equation for X
F(X) 0.13 0.42 0.73 0.02
F(C) 0.79 2.42 0.81 1.82
Equation for C
F(X) 0.58 7.94*** 8.08*** 2.20
F(C) 0.78 42.64*** 3.92** 14.23***
Equation for X
F(X) 0.71 1.98 2.74* 1.68 2.83*
F (Rs) 3.65** 1.51 14.91*** 3.52* 25.11***
Equation for Rs
F(X) 2.48 0.58 0.50 0.02 1.15
F (Rs) 10.90*** 1.22 3.69** 3.35* 0.48
Equation for X
F(X) 0.07 .35 2.64 1.21
F (Rl) 3.57* 4.84** 8.32*** 3.13*
Equation for Rl
F(X) 0.04 0.83 0.13 1.99
F (Rl) 0.94 9.89*** 0.37 2.75
Note: X = growth rate of real GNP. See also table 7.8.
lationships to real economic growth. 18 Such exogeneity tests constitute
the modern formal analogue to the investigation ofleads and lags that
has been central to the more traditional business cycle literature. Once
again, however, thechiefimpressiongivenbytheseresultsis theabsence
of persistence over time in familiar simple quantitative relationships.
I8.The underlying vector autoregressions include a constant term and two lags on
each variable in each equation. The results for analogous autoregressions also including
a linear time trend are broadly similar. (The most interesting difference to emerge on
the introduction of a time trend is that Ml no longer helps explain nominal income.)
Two lags appear to be sufficient to eliminate most, if not all, of the serial correlation in
the residualsofthe equationsbasedonthese annualdata. Becauseeachequationincludes
lags on both variables, and therefore a rational distributed lag, there is no limitation on
the length of lag in the economic process represented.420 Benjamin M. Friedman
The often-assumed relationship by which Ml growth helps ex-
plain either nominal or real economic growth, but not vice versa,
appears in the results in tables 7.8 and 7.9 only since World War II,
and only when the first half of the postwar period is included.
Growth in M2 helps explain nominal economic growth only before
World War I, and it does not help explain real economic growth in
this sense in any of the three periods studied. Credit growth helps
explain nominal income growth both in the interwar period and in
the postwar period as long as the more recent postwar years are
included, but for the postwar period as a whole nominal income
growth also helps explain credit growth. Credit growth does not
help explain real income growth in this sense in any period. The
change in short-term interest rates helps explain both nominal and
real income growth, but not"vice versa, in the prewar period and in
the second half of the postwar period. The change in long-term
interest rates helps explain both nominal and real income growth,
but not vice versa, in the interwar period and the first half of the
postwar period.
It is important to distinguish these generally negative findings from
the more traditional propositions, noted and in some cases documented
above, about the comovement in a simple sense, including lead and
lag relationships, connecting income with familiar monetary and finan-
cial variables. As figure 7.1 and tables 7.1 to 7.3 show, each ofthe five
monetary and financial variables considered here has exhibited dis-
tinctly cyclical movements, at least during some time periods. What
the tests in tables 7.8 and 7.9 seek to establish, however, is not just
whether a variable has fluctuated in conjunction with movements in
income, but whether it has shown a relationship to that part of 'the
movement in income that is not explainable in purely autoregressive
terms. Even a readily visible simple relationship to income fluctuations
need not-indeed, evidently often does not-imply a corresponding
relationship to the elements ofincome fluctuations that are not purely
autoregressive.
More important, the basic theme of this paper focuses less on what
helps explain what than on which, if any, quantitative relationships
have persisted across spans of time during which the United States
financial markets have undergone changes like those reviewed in sec-
tion 7.1, which at least in principle could have importantly affected the
monetary and financial aspects of economic fluctuations. Table 7.10
presents further F-statistics testing the null hypothesis of absence of
structural change in the bivariate relationships summarized in tables
7.8 and 7.9 against the alternative hypothesis of breaks at World War
II and at the midpoint of the postwar period to date (and also, for
relationships involving M2 and the short-term interest rate, at World421 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
Table 7.10 Test Statistics for Stability in Bivariate Annual Relationships
Break at 1916 Break at 1940 Break at 1965
Equation for Y 6.15*** 9.34***
Equation for M 1 6.80*** 8.07***
Equation for Y 22.92*** 5.01***
Equation for M2 12.45*** 24.24***
Equation for Y 2.12** 34.49***
Equation for C 15.45*** 5.59***
Equation for Y 13.90*** 2.56** 5.23***
Equation for Rs 4.26*** 24.16*** 52.23***
Equation for Y 5.12*** 10.93***
Equation for Rl 4.68*** 52.91***
Equation for X 8.23*** 7.92***
Equation for M 1 6.64*** 13.26***
Equation for X 20.24*** 4.26***
Equation for M2 24.58*** 15.49***
Equation for X 1.72 9.42***
Equation for C 18.97*** 10.79***
Equation for X 10.76*** 2.49** 2.16
Equation for Rs 6.43*** 22.66*** 50.77***
Equation for X 3.87*** 10.91***
Equation for Rl 4.79*** 55.82***
Note: See tables 7.8 and 7.9.
War I). In all but two isolated cases, the data indicate significant struc-
tural change. What is especially striking in the results ofthese stability
tests is that even sets of coefficients that tables 7.8 and 7.9 report to
be not significantly different from zero are nonetheless significantly
different from one another.
Annual data, of course, may simply be too coarse to capture the
relevant behavior connecting these aspects of aggregative economic
activity. Tables 7.11 and 7.12 therefore present F-statistics for analo-
gous bivariate exogeneity tests for the respective relationships ofnom-
inal and real income growth to the growth of money (M1) and credit
and the change in short- andlong-term interestrates, basedonquarterly
data for the post-World War II period. 19 Money growth consistently
helps explain both nominal and real economic growth, as is familiar
from previous work, but these results show that either nominal or real
income growth also typically helps explain money growth (so that money
does not "cause" income in the Granger sense). Credit growth helps
19. The underlying vector autoregression systems include a constant term and four
lags on each variable in eachequation. (The discussionoflag lengthinfootnote 18 applies
here too.) Once again, the results for analogous autoregressions also including a linear
time trend are broadly similar.422 Benjamin M. Friedman
Table 7.11 Summary of Bivariate Quarterly Relationships: Financial Variables
and Nominal Income
Variable 1952:1 to 1982:4 1952:1 to 1965:4 1966:1 to 1982:4
Equation for Y
F(Y) 3.84*** 2.23* 0.28
F(M) 10.28*** 2.13* 2.80**
Equation for M
F(Y) 4.09*** 2.30* 1.01
F(M) 14.42*** 8.31*** 1.69
Equation for Y
F(Y) 2.95** 2.61** 2.23*
F(C) 13.52*** 1.69 9.04***
Equation for C
F(Y) 2.17* 1.21 1.69
F (C) 45.41*** 2.50* 28.22***
Equation for Y
F(Y) 3.93*** 2.94** 0.30
F(Rs) 5.43*** 5.75*** 4.03***
Equation for Rs
F(Y) 0.68 1.42 1.02
F (Rs) 5.99*** 6.71*** 2.65**
Equation for Y
F(Y) 6.33*** 8.39*** 0.32
F (Rl) 0.94 1.42 0.69
Equation for Rl
F(Y) 0.88 1.36 0.81
F (Rl) 2.04* 1.10 3.39**
Note: Values shown are F-statistics.
Definitions of variable symbols:
Y = growth rate of nominal GNP;
M = growth rate ofMl money stock;
C = growth rate of domestic nonfinancial credit;
Rs = change in prime commercial paper rate;
Rl = change in Baa bond rate.
Significance levels:
*Significant at .10 level.
**Significant at .05 level.
***Significant at .01 level.
explain nominal income, but not vice versa, in the second half of the
postwarperiod. Forthe postwarperiod as a whole, creditgrowth again
helps explain nominal income growth, while the reverse effect is only
marginally significant. Changes in short-term interestrates consistently
help explain nominal income growth, but not vice versa, and the same
is true with respect to real income growth in the later postwar years.
Changes in long-term interest rates never help explain income at all in
this context. Finally, table 7.13 shows that most of these quarterly
results also fail to exhibit stability across the earlier and later halves423 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
Table 7.12 Summary of Bivariate Quarterly Relationships: Financial Variables
and Real Income
Variable 1952:1 to 1982:4 1952:1 to 1965:4 1966:1 to 1982:4
Equation for X
F(X) 3.91*** 3.43** 1.35
F(M) 3.81*** 3.72** 3.32**
Equation for M
F(X) 2.71** 2.30* 0.97
F(M) 21.02*** 7.24*** 2.05*
Equation for X
F(X) 3.16** 6.83*** 0.89
F(C) 0.69 3.12** 0.54
Equation for C
F(X) 4.94*** 4.39*** 0.84
F(C) 58.09*** 1.49 24.15***
Equation for X
F(X) 4.61*** 3.57** 2.63**
F (Rs) 5.44*** 1.20 5.81***
Equation for Rs
F(X) 3.70*** 3.46** 1.95
F (Rs) 7.40*** 4.30*** 3.90***
Equation for X
F(X) 5.47*** 4.90*** 1.91
F (Rl) 1.00 0.88 0.75
Equation for Rl
F(X) 1.31 2.18* 1.73
F (Rl) 2.35* 1.39 3.10**
Note: X = growth rate ofreal GNP. See table 7.11.
of the postwar period. Further results (not shown) are also broadly
similar for other logical break points like those suggested in section
7.2.
One reason relationships like these may appear to be unstable, of
course, is that they are misspecified-for example, by the omission of
otherrelevantvariables. Given the resultsfor thebivariaterelationships
in tables 7.8 and7.9 and tables 7.11 and 7.12, in which several monetary
and financial variables each appear to be related to either nominal or
real income growth at least in some periods, it is difficult to justify the
use ofonly bivariate relationships. Table 7.14 presents F-statistics for
analogous exogeneity tests based on a five-variable annual system in-
cluding real income growth, price inflation, money (Ml) growth, credit
growth, and the change in the short-term interest rate, for the same
interwar and postwar periods studied earlier.
Even with only three monetary and financial variables in the system,
however, it is difficult to draw any solid conclusions from this expanded
analysis. Among the three, only money growth significantly helps ex-424 Benjamin M. Friedman


































Note: See tables 7.11 and 7.12.
plain real income growth-given the presence of the other included
variables-in any period examined, and even this effect is evident only
for samples including the first halfofthe postwarperiod.20 At the same
time, real income growth helps explain both money growth and credit
growth during the full postwar period, and it also helps explain money
growth during the later postwar years. Real income growth only mar-
ginally helps explain the short-term interest rate change. Once again,
what significant regularities do appear have not been regular enough
to persist across different time periods.
The same generalizationalso characterizes analogous resultsfor mul-
tivariate systems estimated for the post-World War II period using
quarterly data. There is little point in displaying vast quantities of
empirical results along these lines, since the basic lack ofconsistency
is readily apparent just from a summary of what does and does not
help explain real income growth in quarterly systems basedondifferent
subperiods. For the quarterly version ofthe samefive-variable system
shown in table 7.14, neither money growth nor credit growth nor the
short-term interest rate change significantly helps explain real income
growth, even at the .10 level-again, given the presence of one an-
other-for 1952:1 to 1982:4, 1952:1 to 1965:4, or 1966:1 to 1982:4. By
20. In this system the most interesting difference to appear on the introduction of a
time trend is that the one variable that helps explain real income growth is not money
growth but the change in short-term interest rates.425 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
Table 7.14 Summary of Annual Relationships: Five-Variable System
Variable 1919-40 1947-82 1947-65 1966-82
Equation for X
F(X) 0.40 3.95** 1.50 1.42
F (P) 0.82 1.13 1.46 1.51
F(M) 0.59 5.17** 4.11* 2.44
F(C) 0.44 0.85 0.40 3.18
F (Rs) 2.43 2.49 0.09 3.43
Equation for P
F(X) 4.51** 4.46** 3.67* 1.64
F(P) 5.61*** 3.50** 0.67 0.83
F(M) 8.59*** 0.52 1.07 1.10
F(C) 2.86 2.75* 0.01 1.74
F (Rs) 2.59 6.57*** 0.40 3.08
Equation for M
F (X) 1.06 6.15*** 2.04 5.04***
F (P) 0.82 1.04 0.22 9.35***
F(M) 2.18 0.38 1.19 1.95
F (C) 1.64 4.58** 0.85 10.41**
F (Rs) 2.56 2.74* 0.29 10.66**
Equation for C
F(X) 1.11 11.57*** 3.69* 0.88
F(P) 0.68 3.25* 0.28 1.00
F(M) 1.69 0.34 0.89 1.29
F(C) 1.66 11.62*** 0.94 4.87*
F (Rs) 3.81* 3.44** 0.46 1.39
Equation for Rs
F(X) 0.99 2.74* 0.64 3.70*
F(P) 0.54 1.62 0.07 0.35
F(M) 0.41 1.12 0.07 2.15
F(C) 2.15 2.38 0.12 1.51
F (Rs) 0.27 2.24 0.29 2.16
Note: Variables shown are F-statistics.
Definitions of variable symbols:
X = growth rate of real GNP;
P = growth rate of GNP price deflator;
M = growth rate of M1 money stock;
C = growth rate of domestic nonfinancial credit;
Rs = change in prime commercial paper rate.
Significance levels:
*Significant at .10 level.
**Significant at .05 level.
***Significant at .01 level.
contrast, for thefour-variable system estimated for 1953:1 to 1978:4 in
Friedman (1983c), including all of the same variables as in table 7.14
except the interest rate change, money growth and credit growth each
significantly help explain real income growth at the .05 level.21 Simi-
larly, for the six-variable system estimated for 1962:3 to 1979:3 in Clar-
21. In this system real growth in tum helps explain money growth but not credit
growth.426 Benjamin M. Friedman
ida and Friedman (1984), including all the same variables as in table
7.14 plus the change in the federal government budget deficit, credit
growth significantly helps explain real income growth at the .01 level,
money growth does so at the .05 level, and the short-term interest rate
change does so at the .10 level.22
Moreover, these multivariate relationships too show significant evi-
dence ofinstability from one time period to another, thereby revealing
that the instability of the bivariate systems documented in table 7.10
is not due to anything so simple as merely omitting a small number of
familiar variables. Table 7.15 presents F-statistics testing the null hy-
pothesis of absence of structural change in the five-variable annual
relationships summarized in table 7.14, and in the corresponding quar-
terly relationships, against the alternative hypothesis of a break be-
tween the interwarand postwarperiods orbetween the first and second
halves ofthe postwarperiod. The annual dataindicate significant struc-
tural change in each relationship at World War II, though only for the
interest rate equation at 1965. The appearance ofstability between the
first and second halves of the postwar period is probably just due to
lack ofdegrees offreedom, however, since the corresponding quarterly
data indicate highly significant structural change in each relationship
at 1965:4. In sum, neither using quarterly data in place ofannual, nor
using multivariate systems in place ofbivariate, nor doing both at once
overturns the general finding of heterogeneity from one period to an-
other in the monetary and financial aspects ofeconomic fluctuations.
Finally, because the very notion of business "cycles" suggest the
possibility of comovements that recur at possibly regular intervals, it
is interesting to see whether the frequency domain properties of the
comovements studied here can provide further information to supple-
ment the time-·domain properties reported above. In particular, what
Table 7.15 Test Statistics for Stability in Five-Variable System
























Note: See table 7.14.
22. In this system real growth in turn helps explain money growthbut not credit growth
or the interest rate change.427 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
light can the associated frequency domain properties ofthese data shed
onfamiliar questions like the''leads andlags" ofmonetaryandfinancial
aspects of economic fluctuations?
As would be expected, frequency domain methods immediately con-
firm the presence of strong cyclical comovements along the lines re-
ported in section 7.2. The top two panels of figure 7.2 show the
respective power spectra of money growth and credit growth, esti-
mated using the full sets of available postwar quarterly data spanning
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Fig. 7.2 Money and credit: spectra and coherences with real GNP.
23. This exercise relies on data for the full postwar period, despite the time domain
evidence of structural change within that period, so as to provide enough observations
to make the frequency domain analysis sensible. Both spectra, as well as the coherences
displayed below, were estimated using a triangular window with bandwidth eleven.428 Benjamin M. Friedman
spectra display substantial "noise" at high frequencies-say, 1.5 ra-
dians and above. More important from the'perspective ofthe questions
addressed here, both also display significant power at or near fre-
quencies plausibly related to recognized business cycles. The record
of seven complete cycles from the peak in 1948:4 to that in 1981:3
implies a mean cycle length ofjust under nineteen calendar quarters,
equivalent to a frequency of almost exactly one-third radian. The
spectra ofboth money growth and credit growth display sharp spikes
at just that point.
Closer analysis ofthese two power spectra indicates, however, that
the respectivefrequency domain properties ofmoney andcreditgrowth
are not identical. In the range of0.20 to 0.79 radian, corresponding to
a period oftwo to eight years, the value ofthe test statistic for the null
hypothesis ofno difference between the two spectrais 3.90 (distributed
normally with 22 degrees offreedom), indicating that the two spectra
do differ significantly at the .01 level.24 One way to explore further the
nature ofthis difference in the frequency domain properties ofmoney
and credit growth is to examine their respective coherences with real
income growth, shown in the bottom two panels of figure 7.2. Not
surprisingly, both coherences display increases at about one-third ra-
dian. In the same range of 0.20 to 0.79 radian, the coherence of real
income growth with money growth is .98 with standard error .01, while
the coherence of real income growth with credit growth is .96, with
standard error .02. 25
In the same vein as the analysis oflead and lag relationships via the
bivariate exogeneity tests reported above, a plausible question to ask
in this context is whether these respective coherences indicate that
eithermoneygrowthorcreditgrowth, orboth, tends toleadreal income
growth. In fact, both do so, and credit somewhat more so, although
the indicated leads are both surprisingly short in comparison to those
usually suggested in the time domain literature. Money growth leads
real income growth by a phase angle ofonly 0.11 radian (or0.35 quarter,
based on the 20-quarter midpoint ofthe two- to eight-year range) with
standard error .05, while credit growth leads real income growth by
0.32 radian (or 1.02 quarters) with standard error .06. Even so, the
difference between these two leads is not statistically significant. The
value of the test statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference be-
tween the two coherences in the same 0.20 to 0.79 radian range is only
.39 (distributed as a t-statistic with 22 degrees offreedom), not signif-
icant at any reasonable level.
24. I amgratefultoJimPowellforassistanceinconstructingthetestsandforcalculating
the test statistics and their distributions reported here and in section 7.6 below.
25. With the estimated coherences so close to unity, the calculated standard errors
are not well behaved.429 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
In addition, in the same vein as the analysis of partial relationships
via the multivariate exogeneity tests reported above, a further plausible
question to ask in this contextis whetherthe partialcoherenceofeither
money growth orcredit growth with real income growth is significantly
different from zero-in other words, whether either adds significantly
to explaining the frequency domain properties ofreal income growth-
given the presence ofthe other. As is largely consistent with the time
domain results, the answer is no in both cases. For the same range of
0.20 to 0.79 radian, the values ofthe relevant test statistic (distributed
as an F-statistic with 2 and 20 degrees of freedom) are .04 for the
additional role ofmoney growth and .42 for the additional role ofcredit
growth. Neither value is significant at any reasonable level.
7.5 Statistical Significance and Economic Significance
The results of the stability tests reported in tables 7.10 and 7.15
indicate strong evidence ofstatistically significant differences, between
one time period and another, in both bivariate and multivariate rela-
tionships summarizing the monetary and financial aspects of United
States economic fluctuations. For many purposes, however, the sta-
tistical significance ofsuch differences does not necessarily mean they
are significant in a broader economic sense. After all, two correspond-
ing coefficients, estimated for different time periods, can differ by an
amount that is statistically significant but economically trivial if each
is individually measured with sufficient precision. In addition, in dy-
namic relationships involving several coefficients, offsetting shifts in
different coefficients can leave important properties of the resulting
overall relationship unaffected.
The structural shifts in the monetary and financial aspects of the
United States business cycle experience reported above are significant
notjust statistically but economically as well. Table 7.16 shows the full
sets ofestimation results for the bivariate annual relationship between
real income growth and money growth summarized in the top section
oftable 7.9, for 1919-40,1947-65, and 1966-82, respectively. As table
7.10 shows, the data indicate statistically significant shifts in these two
estimated relationships. Comparison of the three full sets of results
shown in table 7.16 confirms that these significant differences are typ-
ically due not to small changes in a few precisely measured coefficients
but to one or even several quite large changes, sometimes even in-
volving switches of sign.
Figure 7.3 shows the implications of the differences among these
respective sets of estimated coefficients for the overall relationship
between real income growth and money growth by tracing out the first
ten years ofthe dynamic response pattern exhibited by the solved-out430 Benjamin M. Friedman
Table 7.16 Bivariate Relationships between Real Income and Money
1919-40
X t = .019 + .190Xt- 1 - .106Xt - 2 + .277Mt- 1 - .157Mt - 2
(.9) (.5) (- .3) (.6) (- .4)
R2 = .00 SE = .089 DW = 2.02
M t = .022 + .024Xt- 1 + .156Xt - 2 + .702Mt- 1 - .581Mt- 2
(1.3) (.1)" (.6) (1.9) (-1.9)
R2 = .28 SE = .071 DW = 1.66
1947-65
X t = .060 - .156Xt - 1 + .351Xt- 2 + .142Mt - 1 - 1.21Mt- 2
(4.1) (-.5) (1.5) (.3) (-3.3)
R2 = .32 SE = .023 DW = 1.46
M t = .020 + .018Xt- 1 + .365Xt - 2 + .216Mt - 1 - .596Mt - 2
(2.6) (.1) (2.8) (.8) (-2.9)
R2 = .38 SE = .013 DW = 2.13
1966-82
X t = .089 + .211Xt - 1 - .164Xt - 2 + .269Mt- 1 - .837Mt- 2
(3.0) (.5) (-.5) (-.4) (- 1.2)
R2 = .19 SE = .024 DW = 2.01
M t = .045 - .034Xt - 1 - .147Xt- 2 + .429Mt- 1 - .071Mt- 2
(2.8) (-.2) (-.9) (1.1) (-.2)
R2 = .02 SE = .013 DW = 2.17
Note: X = growth rate ofreal GNP; M = growth rate ofMl money stock;R2 = adjusted
coefficient of determination; SE = standard error of estimate; DW = Durbin-Watson
statistic. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
(but not orthogonalized) moving average representation ofeach ofthe
three estimated bivariate autoregressions. The implied own-disturbance
responses shown in the upper left and lower right panels ofthe figure
are roughly similar among the three systems, but the implied cross-
disturbance responses shown in the upper right and lower left panels
diverge sharply and even include differences in the direction of the
initial responses.
Table 7.17 and figure 7.4 present analogous sets ofestimation results
and associated dynamic response patterns for the bivariate annual re-
lationship between real income growth and credit growth summarized
in the middle section oftable 7.9. Here again, large differences appear
among corresponding coefficients estimated for different time periods,
as do readily visible differences among the implied response patterns,
especially for the respective cross-responses. In addition, further re-
sults (not shown) indicate similar large differences for systems relating
the growth of either money or credit to nominal income growth, as
well as for systems relating either real or nominal income growth to
the change in short-term interest rates. Finally, still further results (also
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Fig. 7.3 Responses of money and real GNP to unit disturbances.432 Benjamin M. Friedman
Table 7.17 Bivariate Relationships between Real Income and Credit
1919-40
X t = .027 + .161Xt - 1 - .063Xt- 2 + .959Ct - 1 - .962Ct- 2
(1.1) (.5) (- .2) (.8) (- 1.3)
ji2 = .00 SE = .086 DW = 2.00
Ct = .012 + .109Xt - 1 - .027Xt- 2 + .350Ct - 1 - .117Ct- 2
(1.5) (1.1) (- .3) (1.0) (- .1)
Ji2 = .16 SE = .026 DW = 1.30
1947-1965
X t = .015 - .235X t - 1 + .355Xt - 2 + .896Ct - J - .563Ct - 2
(.4) (- .8) (1.0) (1.3) (- .8)
W = -.16 SE = .029 DW = 1.95
Ct = .045 - .389Xt - 1 + .135Xt - 2 + .647Ct - 1 - .242Ct- 2
(3.7) (-3.9) (1.2) (2.8) (- 1.1)
Ji2 = .45 SE = .009 DW = 2.05
1966-82
X t = .055 - .OO9Xt- 1 - .052Xt - 2 + 1.01Ct - 1 - 1.32Ct- 2
(1.7) (- .0) (- .2) (1.4) (- 1.8)
Ji2 = .13 SE = .025 DW = 2.08
Ct = .035 - .195Xt - 1 - .086Xt- 2 + 1.16Ct - 1 - .439Ct- 2
(2.5) (-1.4) (-.7) (3.7) (- 1.5)
Ji2 = .65 SE = .010 DW = 2.27
Note: C = growth rate ofdomestic nonfinancial credit. See also table 7.16.
terns based on quarterly data, estimated for 1947:1to 1965:4 and 1966:1
to 1982:4.
In sum, the differences between one time period and another that
characterize the monetary and financial aspects of United States eco-
nomic fluctuations have been significant both statistically and econom-
ically, reflecting majordifferences in the magnitude as well as the timing
of the comovements between income and money, credit, and interest
rates.
7.6 The Credit Cycle
A final financial aspect of United States economic fluctuations that
bears investigation here is the familiar "credit cycle" by which the
economy's public and private sectors alternate over the business cycle
in their respective volumes of credit-market borrowing. In brief, the
basic idea behind this familiar notion is that the federal government's
reliance on the credit market typically bulges when weakness in the
economy enlarges the government's budget deficit, whereas the private
sector's borrowing does just the opposite as a consequence of the
cyclical variation oftypically debt-financed spending. As a result, fed-
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Fig. 7.4 Responses of credit and real GNP to unit disturbances.
expansions, whereas private sector borrowing is greater in expansions
thanin contractions. This cyclical regularityis broadlyfamiliarin some-
what general terms, although to date little if any formal analysis of it
has appeared.
Table 7.18 summarizes the main outlines ofthis regularity by showing
the respective quarterly average growth rates of federal government434 Benjamin M. Friedman
Table 7.18 Postwar Cyclical Movements of Govemment and Private Sector
Debt
Average Growth Rate Average Growth Rate
Business Cycles of Government Debt of Private Debt




























Mean for all 5.69% 7.76%
contractions
Mean for all 5.30% 9.80%
expansions
Note: Values shown are in percent per annum.
debt and the remainder of domestic nonfinancial credit (including the
debt of state and local governments) during the six and one-half rec-
ognized business cycles since 1953. In part because ofthe lag offederal
tax receipts behind fluctuations in economic activity, but also in part
because ofthe upward secular trend in the growth rate offederal debt
outstanding (as budget deficits have grown, while the level offederal
debt outstanding has shrunk, relative to nonfinancial economic activ-
ity), the basic regularity of the "credit cycle" is more uniformly de-435 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
scriptive ofprivate than ofpublic borrowing.26 Infour contractions out
of six, average federal debt growth was faster than in the preceding.
expansion, but the mean difference in growth rates between contrac-·
tions and expansions has been only 0.39% per annum. By contrast,
private debt growth in each expansion has been faster than in the
preceding contraction, and private debtgrowth in each contraction has
beenslowerthanin theprecedingexpansion, resultingin a meangrowth
rate in expansions 2.04% per annum greater than in contractions.
Attempts to analyze the dynamic aspects ofthese regularities using
the same time-domain results applied in section 7.4 yielded few inter-
esting results, but the corresponding frequency domain results do bear
inspection. The top two panels offigure 7.5 show the respective power
spectraoffederal and private sectordebtgrowth, estimated using quar-
terly data for 1952:1 to 1982:4. The spectrum for federal debt growth
displays an obvious spike at almost exactly the mean cyclicalfrequency
ofone-third radian, while that for private debt growth exhibits a large
spike at a frequency only moderately higher. In contrast to the results
reported in section 7.4 for the growth of money and credit, the re-
spective frequency domain properties offederal and private debt growth
do not exhibit significant differences. In the range of0.20-0.79 radian,
the value of the test statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference
between these two spectra is only .44 (distributed normally with 22
degrees offreedom), not significant atany reasonable level. The bottom
two panels offigure 7.5 show the respective coherences offederal debt
growth and private debt growth with real income growth. Both show
increases ataboutone-third radian, although the coherences are smaller
than those reported above for the growth of money and credit. In the
same range of0.20-0.79 radian, the coherence of real income growth
with federal debt growth is .36 with standard error .19, while the co-
herence between private debt growth and real income growth is .77
with standard error .09.
In addition to this evidence of regular comovements offederal and
private debt growth with real income growth at cyclical frequencies,
the associated phase relationships (corresponding to leads and lags in
the time domain) provide some support for the idea that private bor-
rowing helps in part to determine real income while the federal gov-
ernment's budget posture reacts passively.2.7 Federal debt growth lags
26. See Friedman 1983a for a discussion ofthe divergent trends in federal deficits and
federal debt outstanding in relation to economic activity.
27. This ideais consistentwith a cyclicalrolefor "creditcrunches." Itis alsoconsistent
with the fact that only about one-fourth ofthe cumulative federal budget deficit incurred
during the period under study here would have emerged had the economy remained at
"high employment" throughout; see again, for example, Friedman 1983a.436 Benjamin M. Friedman
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Fig. 7.5 Federal debt and private debt: spectra and coherences with
real GNP.
real income growth by a phase angle of 1.47 radians (or 4.7 quarters)
with standard error .55, while private debt growth leads real income
growth bya phaseangle of0.97 radians (or3.1 quarters) with a standard
errorof.18. Despite the small standard errors, however, these apparent
differences are not statistically significant. The value ofthe test statistic
for the null hypothesis of no difference between the two coherences
in the same 0.20-0.79 radian range is only 0.002 (distributed as a t-
statistic with 22 degrees offreedom).
Similar negative results emerge from asking whether either federal
debt growth orprivate debt growth significantly contributes to explain-
ing the frequency domain properties ofreal income, growth in the pres-
ence ofthe other.28 In the range of0.20-0.79 radian, the values ofthe
28. The lack ofsignificance here parallels the results oftime domain exogeneity tests.437 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
test statistic (distributed as an F-statistic with 2 and 20 degrees of
freedom) for the partial coherence of real income growth with federal
debt growth and with private debt growth--in each case taking the
other as given-are respectively 1.49 and 0.17. Neither is significant
at the .10 level.
In sum, there is evidence ofa "credit cycle" in the sense ofregular
movements offederal and private sector debt growth, and regular co-
movements of each with real income growth, at cyclical frequencies.
In addition, there is some indication that private debt growth leads real
income growth while federal debt growth lags, but the differences be-
tween these respective comovements are not statistically significant,
nor does either federal or private debt growth contain significant in-
formation about real income growth beyond what is also in the other.
7.7 Summary of Conclusions
Therecanbe no doubt thateconomic fluctuations in the United States
have their monetary and financial side. The comovements among money,
credit, interest rates, and nonfinancial economic activity are evident
enough at the crudest eyeball level of inspection, as well as in the
results of more sophisticated time and frequency domain exercises.
Moreover, many of these comovements have coincided with major
historical business cycle episodes.
On closer inspection, however, these monetary and financial aspects
of United States economic fluctuations exhibit few quantitative regu-
larities that have persisted unchanged across spans of time in which
the nation's financial markets have undergone profound and far-reaching
changes. The evidence for the absence of such persistent quantitative
regularities assembled in this paper shows major differences among the
pre-World WarI, interwar, andpost-WorldWarII periods, andbetween
the first and second halves ofthe postwar period. Evidence suggesting
changes from one period to another repeatedly emerges, regardless of
whether the method ofanalysis is simple or sophisticated, whether the
underlying data are annual or quarterly, and whether the relationships
under study are bivariate or multivariate. ~Moreover, the differences
between one period and another reported here are significant not just
statistically but economically as well, in the sense ofmajor differences
in the magnitude and timing of cyclical comovements.
The paper's main message, therefore, is a warning against accepting
too readily--either as a matter of positive economics or for policy
purposes-the appearance ofsimple and eternal verities in much ofthe
existing literature of monetary and financial aspects of business fluc-
tuations. More complicated models involving many variables and/or
nonlinear relationships may have remained stable, but the evidence438 Benjamin M. Friedman
clearly shows that simple linear relationships among only a few such
variables have not.
Comment Stephen M. Goldfeld
Benjamin Friedman has given us an extensive empirical analysis ofthe
behavior ofmonetary and financial variables over the businesss cycle.
One aim ofthis paper seems to be engendering humility regarding what
we as economists thinK we know about the world. More specifically,
by a range ofalternative procedures, Friedman seeks to establish the
proposition that the cyclical behavior of monetary and financial vari-
ables does not exhibit persistent regularities. Put in somewhat over-
simplified terms, movements in both nominal and real GNP do not
seem to be related in a stable fashion to a conventional set ofmonetary
and financial variables. Or to put it more crudely still, the great ratios
ofeconomics are not so great.
A second aim ofthe paper, and perhaps the major one, is to impart
the message that this humble view ofwhat we know should condition
our policy prescriptions. That is, we should avoid making monetary
policy on the presumption of any assumed statistical regularity, let
alone on the presumption that this regularity will persist for long pe-
riods. Although not so identified, this is clearly the intergenerational
battle of the Friedmans, and while my heart lies with the younger
generation, I'm not sure the evidence presented is ultimately as per-
suasive as young Friedman suggests.
Friedman begins by characterizing the dramatic changes in the fi-
nancial structure ofthe United States economy over the past seventy
years. He considers three classes ofchange-in the role of monetary
policy, in government regulations and intermediation, and -in private
financial institutions and practices-and amply documents each. The
list provided is impressive, so impressive, in fact, that Friedman says
it would be astonishingifthecyclicalbehaviorofmonetary andfinancial
variables had not been altered. One almost senses that Friedman is
ready to declare victory at this point, but he wisely recognizes that the
negative-thinking approach to positive economics is not particularly
persuasive and turns to the evidence.
The evidence presented is diverse in terms of technique, ranging
from the pictorial and arithmetic to relatively sophisticated techniques
for analyzing time series. To begin with, the long-term behavior of a
number of monetary and financial variables is displayed visually. The
Stephen M. Goldfeld is professor ofeconomics at Princeton University.439 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
basic cyclical relationships are then quantified for the postwar period.
These apparent regularities are then subjected to closer scrutiny. This
is first done by computing simple annual correlations between real
economic growth and a substantial number of variables, measuring
changes in money, credit, and interest rates for various leads and lags
and for alternative sample periods. On the whole, these calculations
show substantial variations, in terms both of magnitude and of statis-
tical significance, across time periods.
However, the lack of stability of simple correlation coefficients is
rather weak evidence ofany more fundamental structural change. These
correlation coefficients are merely summary statistics of a complex
multivariate stochastic process, and these is no reason, even if the
underlying process remains the same, for these bivariate correlations
to remain "stable" across time periods. Forexample, in a conventional
simultaneous equations model, we know that the correlation between
any two endogenous variables will depend on all the exogenous vari-
ables in the system. The finding that two endogenous variables have
different sample correlations for different time periods may simply
reflect the behavior ofthe exogenous variables in the two time periods.
Friedman, of course, is well aware of these potential difficulties and
consequently presents an alternative analysis of the same data using
the more sophisticated vector autoregression technique (VAR).
Friedmanfirst estimates bivariate VARs with annual datausing either
real or nominal GNPgrowth and a measure ofmoney orcredit growth.
Overall summary measures of statistical significance are reported for
various time periods, and inspection suggests that persistent regulari-
ties are few and far between. Friedman confirms this impression with
an extensive set of tests for structural stability that generally indicate
widespread structural change. With the recognition that annual data
may be incapable ofcapturing the relevant dynamics, Friedmanrepeats
a similar exercise with postwar quarterly data and an expanded set of
financial measures. Structural instability is once again evident and
widespread.
Finally, the robustness of these results is examined with reference
to larger VAR models. Selected results are presented for a five-variable
annual model, suggesting that structural change is again present. For-
mal stability tests with- this model, for both annual and quarterly data,
confirm these impressions.
The punchline, then, is that monetary and financial variables do not
bear a stable relationship to changes in real and nominal GNP. More-
over, Friedman examines dynamic response patterns and suggests that
these instabilities have economic as well as statistical significance. As
a consequence, policies basedona presumed stabilityare to be avoided.
As noted earlier, I have considerable sympathy for both parts of the440 Benjamin M. Friedman
punchline, but I wonder whether those not so inclined will find the
evidence persuasive.
My doubts on this score stem from the fundamental difficulty of
"proving" that instabilities exist. The standard retort to such exhibi-
tions of instability is that one is simply working with the wrong spec-
ification. This was certainly the response of the vast hordes, myself
included, who attempted to fix up an apparently errant money demand
function in the 1970s. In the present case, the skepticism ofthose who
are not willing to accept Friedman's results is bolstered by the seeming
sensitivity ofthe VAR technique to the size ofthe model used.
In discussing his reasons for using a reduced-form approach such as
a VAR technique, Friedman cites the benefits ofbeing able to sidestep
the inevitably controversial specification issues inherent in a structural
approach. Although these same issues may appear less controversial
in a VAR approach, they are nonetheless of equal substance. For ex-
ample, Friedman briefly reports comparative results for four-, five-,
and6-variable VAR systems, suggesting, as others have similarlyfound,
that adding a single variable to a VAR system can often reverse con-
clusions. When one adds to this all the otherconventional specification
issues (e.g., lag length, use ofdifferencing to achieve stationarity), one
can see why it is tricky to establish the presence ofinstability. These
difficulties are further compounded in the present case by an implicit
assumption made in the tests, namely that the variances in the several
subperiods considered are identical. This assumption is somewhat sus-
pect in the light of the well-established differences in variability for
many economic variables between the prewar and postwar periods.
Given this, it might be desirable to test the hypothesis of coefficient
stability without maintaining the constancy of variances across sub-
periods. Standard methods for doing this are available.
Overall, then, in the face ofthese specification and technical issues,
it is difficult to know what degree of confidence one can have in the
tests of stability reported. Indeed, some may feel there remains sub-
stantial room for indulging one's prior beliefs. Nevertheless, let us
suppose we are fully comfortable with the notion that the instabilities
of the sort Friedman reports are truly genuine. Does it necessarily
follow that something like a constant money growth policy is neces-
sarily worse than it would be in a world where the VAR models had
passed stability tests? Put another way, while I am perfectly willing to
believe that a constant growth rule is not optimal even in a world that
passes stability tests, does such a rule become more suboptimal when
structural stability tests fail? Friedman strongly implies this is the case,
and this view does have some intuitive appeal. However, on closer
examination I am not sure how one would establish this case.
The problem in evaluating a particular monetary policy proposal is,
as in most things, Compared to what? One must be prepared to specify441 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
such an alternative and see how it performs in the face of presumed
instabilities. This in tum would require a more complete characteriza-
tion ofthe nature ofthe instabilities and the learning process whereby
the authorities discover the presence ofstructural shifts. Furthermore,
to be fair to a constant money growth rule, one would not have to
restrict this to a single number to be followed no matter what the
emerging evidence. The only feature necessary to capture the spirit of
this idea is that the constantgrowth be maintained for some substantial
period. I do not know how the results ofsuch an exercise would turn
out, butas a matteroflogic it does not seem that the sortsofinstabilities
Friedman found necessarily add to the case against a constant growth
rule.
To reiterate, I am neithersurprised nordisappointed with Friedman's
findings ofinstabilityandhis policybias. I would be surprised, however,
if the battle did not go on.
Comment Allan H. Meltzer
Near the start of his paper, Benjamin Friedman writes: "The basic
theme ofthis paper... is thatthe quantitative relationships connecting
monetary and financial variables to the business cycle exhibit few if
any strongly persistent regularities that have remained even approxi-
mately invariant in the context of the widespread and, in some in-
stances, dramatic changes undergone by the United States financial
markets." In the conclusion, he repeats this theme: "economic fluc-
tuations exhibit few quantitative regularities that have persisted un-
changed across spans of time in which the nation's financial markets
have undergone profound and far-reaching changes." And he warns us
not to accept "the appearance of simple and eternal verities in much
ofthe previous literature ofmonetary and financial aspects ofbusiness
fluctuations.',
I find these conclusions misleading for at least two reasons. First,
even if we accept Friedman's evidence, it is not clear that it rejects
any well-established proposition. Friedman does not give any clues
about the particular "simple and eternal verities" that should not now
be accepted. Economists have known that numericalestimates ofstruc-
tural parameters and reduced-form coefficients are subject to change
whenever there are changes in behavior. (This is a principal implication
of the early Cowles Commission work on identification that has been
more fully developed in Lucas 1976.) Second, Friedman's paper is
Allan H. Meltzer is a professor in the Graduate School of Industrial Administration
at Carnegie-Mellon University.442 Benjamin M. Friedman
atheoretical, and much of his evidence comes from two-way compar-
isons of financial and real variables. Failure at this level of testing is
informative but not alarming. Vector autoregressions (VARs) using five
or six variables are more informative, but this technique has well-
known limitations that Friedman (1983b) recognizes.
My comment is in three parts. First, I reconsider some ofthe prop-
ositions on the role ofmoney in business cycles developed in the sixties
by Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz (1963a, b), Phillip Cagan
(1965), and Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (1964). I report some
ofthe evidence on theserelations I find in the paper. Second, I comment
on some reasons that Friedman and I draw different conclusions from
his data and suggest that his work is most usefully interpreted as a test
of the quantitative significance of the well-known Lucas critique of
econometric practice. Third, I comment briefly on his discussion of
the credit variable during business cycles.
Money and Business Cycles
G. L. Bach (1963,3) summarized Friedman and Schwartz's contri-
bution at a previous NBER conference as follows: "The Friedman and
Schwartz paper, together with Friedman's other published works, pro-
vide the strongest empirical foundation for the proposition that the
supply ofmoney is a-probably the-dominant variable in determining
the level oftotal spending on current output. . . . there was a general
willingness to admit that the supply of money does now appear to be
an important variable in explaining the level of aggregate spending."
Friedman and Schwartz (1963b) offered a number of propositions
about the stock ofmoney and its rate ofchange during business cycles,
measured according to NBER chronology, and about the relation of
changes in money growth to business cycles. Theyinvestigated cyclical
patterns of velocity and demonstrated the procyclical conformity of
velocity-the finding that velocity rises relative to trend during expan-
sions and declines relative to trend during contractions. They sum-
marized their principal findings as showing "beyond any reasonable
doubt that the stock ofmoney displays a systematic cyclical behavior.
The rate ofchange in the money stock regularly reaches a peak before
the reference peak and a trough before the reference trough, though
the lead is rather variable" (1963b, 63; italics added).
These and otherconclusions were extended in a study ofthe Federal
Reserve system by Brunner and Meltzer (1964), in a study of the cy-
clical and secular behavior of the money stock by Cagan (1965), and
in Friedman and Schwartz's (1963a) Monetary History ofthe United
States. One or more of these studies presented evidence for the fol-
lowing propositions that, together, constituted a major partofthe foun-
dations for "monetarism": (1) money growth rises and falls procycli-
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followed after a lag by cyclical expansions and contractions of real
output;l (3) sustained money growth relative to the growth of output
is a sufficient condition for inflation; (4) market interest rates typically
rise in periods of cyclical expansion and fall in contractions; and (5)
velocity growth is procyclical.
Benjamin Friedman's study ofpostwardatasupports severalofthese
propositions. His table 7.1 shows, as he notes, that money growth is
higher in each expansion than in the preceding or following contrac-
tion. 2 This finding supports proposition 1.
For each peak and trough beginning with the fourth quarter 1949, I
chose the peakand trough in the quarterly rate ofmoney growth nearest
to the quarterly reference peaks or troughs recorded by the NBER.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963b, 37) used peaks and troughs in monthly
rates ofmoney growth as one means ofdating specific cycles in money
and computing the leads of money growth at business cycle turning
points. There are now more sophisticated methods ofcomputing leads
and lags, but my method permits replication ofFriedman and Schwartz's
work on an extended sample. Multiplying the average lead of money
growth measured in quarters by three to compare to Friedman and
Schwartz's monthly data shows that the average lead ofmoney growth
is 10.5 months at reference cycle troughs and 15.4 months at reference
cycle peaks. This lead is one to two months shorter than the earlier
estimates. Given the relatively high variability ofthe leads that Fried-
man and Schwartz note, the difference is not impressive.3 This quan-
titative proposition stands up well.
Table C7.1 Computed Average Lead ofSpecific Cycles in Money Growth (Ml)
before Reference Cycle Turning Points
Peaks
Average at peaks 1953-81
Average all peaks 1870-1960
Average all mild cycles 1870-1960
Troughs
Average at troughs 1949-82
Average all troughs 1870-1960







1. Economists would now substitute "unanticipated moneygrowth" for "accelerations
and decelerations of money." It is not clear that the more precise restatement makes a
major difference for United States data.
2. There is one minor exception. Money growth is higher on average during the 1969-
70 contraction than in the preceding expansion. The lengthy expansion includes a period
of relatively low money growth and low inflation.
3. Dating for each peak and trough is shown in the appendix. Friedman and
Schwartz used M2; I used Ml. Where the two series overlap, differences in dating
are small.444 Benjamin M. Friedman
These data, and econometric studies by Barro (1978), Korteweg (1978),
and others supportproposition2onthe role ofchanges in moneygrowth
as a dominant impulse in business cycles. Proposition 3 on the central
role ofmoney growth for inflation is now accepted by economists with
many fewer reservations or disclaimers than twenty years ago. Fried-
man's comparison ofaverage rates ofgrowth ofnominal and real GNP
during expansions and contractions casts doubt on the relationship,
however. He reports that the differences between the average rate of
change in expansion and the average rate of change in contraction is
the same (6.5%) for nominal and real GNP. Taken literally, this implies
that the average rate ofinflation has been the same for expansions as
for contractions. Since average money growth is procyclical, money
growth differs systematically between half-cycles.
Comparing cyclical average rates ofgrowth of money with inflation
using Friedman's data shows a persistent effect of money growth on
inflation. The comparative size of money growth and inflation is pos-
itively associated without any allowance for lags, supply shocks, or
the effects of real output growth. Rank correlations of half-cycle av-
erage rates of money growth and inflation are .74 for the eight con-
tractions and .89 for the seven expansions. These rank correlations are
significant at better than the .05 and at the .01 level respectively.
Friedman's table 7.2 shows that the average change in short-term
rates is negative in each contraction and positive in each expansion,
as required by proposition 4. The average change in long-term rates is
positive in two of the eight contractions, however, contrary to the
proposition. One of the exceptions includes the first oil shock, when
interest rates were raised by the effects of the supply shock.
Friedman's discussion oftable 7.4 notes that monetary velocity rises
in everyexpansionandfalls in every contraction. This supports a strong
form of proposition 5, since no allowance has to be made for trend.
Velocity growth, like money growth, is higher in each expansion than
in either the preceding or the following contraction.
Thefive propositions ofmonetary economics are supported by Fried-
man's study. Among other propositions, one is of particular interest
for policy. In a recent paper, Brunner and Meltzer (1983) pointed out
that covariances ofmoney growth and velocity growth computed from
quarterly data are positively correlated at times. Friedman shows that
the positive correlation ofmoney growth and velocity growth is found
also for the eight cyclical contractions and for the combined contrac-
tions and expansions. Further, Friedman finds that the variance of
nominal GNP growth is dominated by the variance of money growth
in bothcontractionsand expansions. These findings imply thatconstant
money growth would lower the variability ofGNP growth by reducing
or eliminating the variability of money growth and by removing the445 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
covariance of money growth and velocity growth found during
expansions.
If households are risk averse, welfare increases as the variability of
GNP growth declines. Friedman's estimates suggest that the static
effect ofconstant money growth on nominal GNPgrowth is a reduction
of more than 80% of measured variability in the cyclical averages. Or
to put the same point another way, the data in his table 7.7 imply that
the variability of velocity growth would have to rise by an average of
570% in contractions and 650% in expansions to raise the variability
of GNP growth following the adoption of a rule mandating constant
money growth. This suggests again, that the Federal Reserve's discre-
tionary policy has lowered welfare by adding more variability to GNP
growth than it removed and, at times, by maintaining positive corre-
lation of money growth and velocity growth.
Differences in Interpretation
Friedmanreports and comments on several ofthe relations discussed
in the preceding section. In addition, he analyzes some power spectra
and reports evidence ofcoherence that is consistent with propositions
relating money growth to the fluctuations we call business cycles. Why,
then, is his principal conclusion a warning against accepting these reg-
ularities as a reliable basis for theory or policy?
One reason is that Friedman may have been misled by the data he
presents. He recognizes that the bivariate relationships can be mis-
leading because they omit relevant variables and replace partial re-
sponses with total responses. The vector autoregressions (VAR) have
been the subject of many recent criticisms, and it is now well known
that this method is sensitive to changes in the ordering ofvariables and
the number of variables included in the VAR, and that the results are
subject to the Lucas critique. Elsewhere, Friedman (1983b, 33) has
recognized these criticisms and makes only modest claims about what
can be learned from VARs.
The bivariate relationships are subject to other, no less trenchant
criticisms. Correlations betweenannual dataare unlikely to yield useful
informationaboutbusiness contractions thatlastless thanfour quarters
orare spreadoverparts oftwo calendaryears. Fourofthe eight postwar
contractions are ofthis kind. Quarterly relations are not subject to this
criticism, but they are open to two others ..
First, some of Friedman's tests are not tests of plausible economic
relations. Included here are bivariate tests ofa relation between money
growth and the growth of real income. As tests of a relation running
from money to income, the tests either fail to distinguish between
anticipated and unanticipated money growth or, in the case of the
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running from income to money, they fail to hold prices and interest
rates constant, as required for the demand for money, and fail to take
account ofrelevant foreign variables and exchange regimes as required
for the supply of money. Other tests also have problems. Economic
theory does not imply that interest rates are related in a simple way
to the growth ofreal ornominal income orto the growth rate ofmoney.
Tests of the relation between growth of income, money growth, and
interest rates shed no light, and Friedman does not attempt to interpret
them or provide an analytic foundation to help the reader interpret
them.
Second, work on monetary relations published in the sixties, and
cited above, made no claims that lags are constant or that numerical
values are fixed. Typically, the emphasis was on the variability oflags.
The five propositions discussed in the previous sectiondo notrequire
constant coefficients. Earlier work using the NBER's business cycle
method encouraged a search for common features of business cycles
but did not impose uniform leads or lags or other constant coefficients
on the data. The basic unit of time in these studies is not a year or a
quarter; it is a cyclical phase of varying length when measured in
calendar time but assumed to be comparable to similar phases ofother
cycles. The NBER also distinguished, at times, between wartime and
peacetime cycles, between mild and severe recessions, and between
the recoveries from mild and severe recessions. While I have notfound
the NBER's method attractive, I find it more usefulfor bivariate com-
parisons than Friedman's use ofyears or calendar quarters as units of
observation.
One reason is that the seven expansions studied by Friedman vary
in length from 12 to 106 months, roughly four to thirty five quarters.
The eight contractions vary from 6 to 16 months, or from two to more
than five quarters. Itwould be surprising ifthe forces (including policy)
influencing the length ofexpansions and contractions had no influence
on the measured length oflags and other parameters.
An additional reason for believing that Friedman's null conclusion
is misleading is that economic theory gives no reason for assuming that
lags are constant. The variability ofthe lead ofmoney growth at busi-
ness cycle turning points has frequently been remarked upon. Recent
work shows that the length of leads or lags varies directly with the
ratio ofthe variance ofpermanentto the variance oftransitory changes.
See Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer (1980).
Currentresearchonpolicy rules orregimes, recognizing the so-called
Lucas effect, makes no claim that the parameters ofeconomic models
are invariant to changes in policy rules. At times during this century,
the United States has followed the rules ofthe gold standard, the gold
exchange standard, the Bretton Woods system, the system of fluc-447 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
tuating exchange, and the 1942-51 system of pegged interest rates.
Other countries have experienced as many changes, and often more
violent ones, in monetary regime. Each ofthese regimes, in principle,
changes the path through which money influences economic activity
or the timing ofthe responses ofincome to the stock of money or the
responses of demand for money to income and other variables.
Friedman's findings are not inconsistent with this view. Although he
does not mention the particular changes in policy regimes, in principle
the same conclusion applies to the introduction offederal deposit in-
surance that changed the risk of banks' deposit liabilities, the devel-
opment of substitutes for money, or changes in the effective ceilings
on interest rates arising from the combination of regulation and in-
creased rates ofanticipated inflation.
Friedman's findings are part of the accumulating analysis and evi-
dence on the problems faced by policymakers who seek to control or
modify economic activity using either econometric models and so-
phisticated feedback, control procedures orfully discretionary policies
based on judgment about average responses, or the many mixtures of
these control techniques.4 The results that he calls "qualitative," and
the evidence I summarized in the preceding section, do not rule out
the relevance ofeconomic research and economic theory for economic
policy. Nothing in Friedman's work rejects such quantitative relations
as: (1) the so-called Fisher equation relating nominal rates of interest
to anticipated inflation; (2) approximate long-run proportionality be-
tween growth ofnominal income and money growth; and (3) long-run
purchasing power parity.
The Role of Credit
A considerable part of Friedman's paper compares cyclical prop-
erties ofcredit and money and studies cyclical relations between credit
and other variables. I ignored these sections in the previous comments
because I do not know how to interpret the findings, and Friedman
offers little guidance. A section on the credit cycle discusses some
regular features ofcyclical changes in public and private debt but con-
cludes that movements of private debt provide no information about
the growth ofreal income that is not contained in the growth ofpublic
debt. In an earlier section, Friedman concludes that the growth rate
of credit or of money provides no useful information once the other
growth rate is known.
This last comparison and Friedman's parallel treatment ofcredit and
money throughout the paper suggest that he finds little basis for choos-
4. His finding of an absence of any effect of money on real income--other than
those reported in table 7.9 that are purely autoregressive-is consistent with rational
expectations.448 Benjamin M. Friedman
ing between the two measures. Although I am convinced that the study
ofintermediation is useful, I am as skeptical about Friedman's parallel
treatment ofcredit and money as I am about his procedure for studying
the role of credit or intermediation during business cycles.
Friedman defines credit as the total liabilities of nonfinancial bor-
rowers-private and public-thathave been issued in the financial mar-
kets. He computes a measure ofcredit velocity, defined as the ratio of
GNP to credit, and compares this measure of velocity with monetary
velocity, the ratio of GNP to money.
It is always possible to analyze a stock flow relation by multiplying
a particular stock by its velocity, measured in units per time, so that
the product is equal to the flow. The quantity equation shows that this
tradition is as oldas systematic thinking aboutmoney. Theinitial appeal
ofthe quantity equation, and its persistence through time, owed much
to the (quantitative) empiricalobservationthatprices andothernominal
values move over time in direct proportion to money, although the
correspondence may not be close during a particular year or quarter.
The relation of money to nominal GNP has been formalized in the
quantity theory. Whateverreservations onemay have aboutthe content
of this hypothesis, there can be no doubt about its survival or its
usefulness in explaining differences in rates ofinflation between coun-
tries and in the same country at different times.
There is no comparable hypothesis about domestic nonfinancial credit.
Is there more than arithmetic behind Friedman's idea that the growth
rateofcreditplusthegrowthofcreditvelocityequalsthegrowthofnom-
inal GNP? Is the growth ofnominal GNP independent ofthe growth of
money and dependent on credit? How dependent is the postwargrowth
ofcreditrelative to money onthe effects ofprohibitions oninterestpay-
ments and regulation Q in the presenceofinflationary monetarypolicy?
How dependent is the growth ofthe private component ofcrediton the
growth ofthe public component-the growth ofthe public debt?
Although Friedman does not pursue these issues, his data provide
some answers. Rank correlation ofhis measures ofthe growth ofpublic
and private debt show very little relation between the two during either
expansions or contractions, contrary to the complete crowding out
hypothesis. The difference between the growth of private debt and
money is negatively related to the short-term rate of interest. This
difference is a measure ofthe growth ofintermediation, since Ml and
the monetary base grow at approximately parallel rates during half-
cycles. The measure declined in both expansions and contractions as
interest rates rose. The decline is dramatic, more than 50% on average,
between half-cycles during which short-term market rates are below
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substantially above the ceilings. A smaller and less uniform decline in
the growth of intermediation is shown by the comparison of interest
rates and the difference in the growth rate of total credit and money.
The introduction suggests that the paper will explore relationships
of this kind. Regrettably, it does not do so. Friedman is too eager to
dismiss what is known and too reluctant to use his data to extend
existing theories of the relation of credit and money, or the theory of
intermediation, during business cycles.5
Conclusion
This conference has produced a large number of null results, and
Friedman's paper is of this kind. I am not persuaded that the null
conclusions tell us as much about business cycles as they do about the
method common to many ofthe papers. Perhaps a principal conclusion
to be drawn is that you cannot get something for nothing. If we are
unwilling to impose a structure on the data by stating testable hy-
potheses, the data may mislead us into accepting that the world is as
lacking in structure as this approach.
Benjamin Friedman has ably summarized the data for main finan-
cial variables. I find in his null results additional information about
the errors that are likely to be made w'hen policymakers rely on
estimates from quarterly equations or models. The results are far
less damaging-and often supportive-of well-known qualitative and
quantitative relations between monetary and other variables. My
comments try to make this distinction and to suggest the limits to
the scope of reliable quantitative knowledge that economists and
policymakers face.
At least since the time of Lucas's (1976) critique of econometric
practice and policy simulation, economists have been aware that pa-
rameter estimates of economic models are subject to change when
private or public policies change. The quantitative significance of Lu-
cas's results has beenleft largely to individualjudgment, andjudgments
differ. Friedman's work, summarized in tables 7.10 and 7.15 and in his
discussion of the economic significance of his findings, can be inter-
preted as evidence of the quantitative significance of the Lucas's cri-
tique. Although Friedman avoids this interpretation, I find it appealing
and suggestive ofthe way his study can be a useful start on the quan-
titative analysis of an important topic.
5. One surprising claim is that financial panics "have all but vanished since the es-
tablishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1914 and especially the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation in 1934." This statement neglects the experience from 1929 to
1933 and particularly the waves of banking failures from 1930 until the bank holiday in
March 1933.450 Benjamin M. Friedman
Appendix























Mean lead in quarters 5.14











Reply Benjamin M. Friedman
Allan Meltzer asks what familiar proposition the empirical evidence
assembled in my paper contradicts. Meltzer's question is a useful one,
and it deserves a serious answer.
This book is about business cycles. The focus ofmy contribution to
it is the behavior, in a business cycle context, of money, credit, and
interest rates. Like the book's otherpapers, mine follows conventional
understandingin taking''business cycles" to meanaggregate-level fluc-
tuations in real economic activity, typically lasting more than a year
(for the full cycle) but well under a decade. At the same time, because
money and credit are nominal variables and so may bear a stronger
connection to nominal economic activity, much of the analysis in the
paper focuses on both real and nominal activity measures in parallel.
Ofthe five qualitative propositions Meltzer lists on pages 442-43 of
his comment, therefore, all but the third involve business cycles and451 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
hence are ofat least some interest here. Indeed, as he points out, my
paperpresents evidencecorroboratingeachofthem. By contrast, ofthe
three quantitative relationships he lists on page 447 ofhis comment, none
is ofinterest here (although the Fisher equation certainly could be).
What familiar proposition, then, does the evidence presented in my
paper contradict? It is, in Meltzer's wording, "the role of changes in
moneygrowthas a dominantimpulseinbusiness cycles" -or,in Bach's
even stronger wording, which Meltzer quotes, "the proposition that
the supply of money is a-probably the-dominant variable in deter-
mining the level oftotal spending on current output." 1This proposition
has become as familiar an idea as any that macroeconomics has to
offer. Although it is far from universally believed, there can be little
doubt that acceptance ofit-by economists, by policymakers, and by
the general public-has grown enormously in the twenty years since
the publication of the work Meltzer cites by Friedman and Schwartz,
himself and Brunner, and others.
In his reference to his own table C7.1 and to work by Barro and by
Korteweg, Meltzer treats this quantitative proposition about what is a
(or the) driving force underlying business cycles as equivalent to the
qualitative proposition that changes in money growth "are frequently
followed" by fluctuations ofreal output. But the two are not the same.
The issue is not whether it is possible to replicate the mean lag findings
ofFriedman and Schwartz, as Meltzer does, but whether the evidence
warrants singling out money as playing some special, dominant role in
the initiation orpropagation ofcyclical movements in economic activity.
In short, is there anything special about the role ofmoney in business
cycles? Given that there is no dispute about Meltzer's first and second
qualitative propositions-that money growth varies procyclically and
that it frequently leads cyclical variations ofoutput growth-my paper
addresses this question in three ways. The first is to go beyond the
documentation of whether movements in money growth tell anything
about movements in income growth by asking whether movements in
money growth tell anything about movements in income growth that
prior movements in income growth itself cannot say equally well. The
second is to examine the importance ofother variables in this context,
either indirectly by asking whether what movements in money growth
have to say about movements in income growth varies from one time
period to another, or more directly by asking what movements in sev-
eral variables (including money growth) have to say together. The third
1. The part of Bach's statement Meltzer quotes could, of course, be taken to refer
only to nominal spending without any implications at all for real economic activity and
hence business cycles. A reading of Bach's introduction makes clear that this is not the
case, however, so that Meltzer's citation is apt in tht~ business cycle context.452 Benjamin M. Friedman
is to undertake comparisons, by asking whether what movements in
money growth tell about movements in income growth differs from
what movements in credit and interest rates tell.
The conclusion indicated in my paper is that the evidence does not
identify anything special, or dominant, about the role ofmoney in the
business cycle context. First, although for some time periods there is
evidence that movements in money growth tell something about move-
ments in income growth that prior movements in income growth do
not already say, that evidence is hardly overwhelming, and for other
time periods there is no such evidence. Second, just what it is that
movements in money growth tell about movements in income growth
varies substantially from one time period to another,2 and movements
in money growth do not stand out in this context in a multivariate
setting. Third, movements in other financial variables-specifically,
interest rates and credit-tell about as much about movements in in-
come growth as do movements in money growth.
No, of course these findings do not contradict the qualitative prop-
ositions that money growth varies procyclically and that it frequently
leads real income growth. But they do cast doubt on the quantitative
proposition that the impulse to business cycles from money growth is
dominant in any ordinary sense.
Meltzer's criticism ofthe use oftwo-variable relationships to address
suchquestions-includingin partrelationshipsbetweennominal money
and real income-has merit, as my paper should also make clear.3 But
his brusque treatment of the subject does not get to the fundamental
underlying tension it involves.
At one level, what is being asserted is indeed a relationship between
two variables, one nominal and one real: nominal money growth varies
procyclically, nominal money growth leads real income growth, nom-
inal money growth is a (the) dominant impulse driving real income
growth, and so on. Meltzer's own table C7.1 is itself one way of ex-
amining just this bivariate relationship between nominal money and
2. It is difficult to understand Meltzer's claim that my paper does not acknowledge
"changes in policy regimes" as a source ofthese differences. Ofthe three categories of
change in the economy's financial structure that section 7.1 sets forth as reasons for not
expecting to find unchanging business cycle relationships, the first one discussed is
monetary policy and the second is financial regulation. It is also ironic in this context
that ~feltzer's detailed discussion of what some of my paper's findings imply for a
constant money growth rule simply assumes that the variability of the velocity ratio
would remain invariant to that specific regime change.
3. Meltzeralso criticizes the use ofnatural time units ratherthan business cycle phases
in examining these relationships, but this criticism seems misplaced. If money growth
is dominant in determining income growth, why take the length ofa business expansion
or contraction as exogenous? Regression or vector autoregression relationships based
on natural time units allow the length ofeach movement in income growth to be deter-
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real income. Yet Meltzer wants to disallow evidence from bivariate
relationships in addressing the three questions posed above. Why is it
admissible to ask if money growth leads real income growth but not
to ask ifmoney growth leads the part ofreal income growth that is not
already predictable from past real income growth itself? Why is it
legitimate to examine the relationship ofreal income growth to money
growth but not to credit growth or interest rates?
The tension here arises because, ifotherthings beside money growth
matter for business cycles, then a simple two-variable relationship be-
tween money growth and real income growth is fundamentally mis-
specified. This misspecification has significant implications bothfor the
use ofsimple money/income relationships in economic forecasting and
policymakingand for the investigation ofhypotheses like those in ques-
tion here. In both settings it is then necessary to admit that the world
is more complicated, and to advance to richer representations impor-
tantly featuring variables other than money. In the research context,
my paper shows that simply moving to nonstructural systems ofmod-
estly higher orderdoes not satisfactorily represent this complexity (nor
does it indicate any special role for money growth), and here I fully
agree with Meltzer about the need for structural analysis. As most
readers ofthis volume surely know, however, it is hardly the case that
the evidence from structural models clearly points toward money growth
as the driving force behind business cycles either.
In sum, the thrustofMeltzer's commentis that somehow economists
know, presumably from the work ofFriedman and Schwartz and their
followers, that money growth is what matters most for business fluc-
tuations, and that efforts to question whether this is so, or to examine
the role of other variables, must accept the burden of proof. That
position is untenable. One cannot simultaneously embrace the long
tradition of nonstructural investigation ofthe relation between money
growth and the business cycle-including simple lead/lag analysis early
on, then straightforward regression analysis, and more recently bi- or
even multivariate autoregression analysis-but ignore parallel inves-
tigations showing comparable results for other variables. One cannot
accept the conclusions ofwhatever structural analyses indicate a unique
role for money yet discard all those that do not.
Nowhere is this schizophrenic view more apparent than in Meltzer's
concluding section remarking on the approach maintained throughout
my paper ofexamining, in a way parallel to that applied to money, the
role ofcredit-thatis, ofa nominal financial quantity otherthan money.
Meltzer acknowledges that the results provide little or no empirical
basis for choosing between money and credit as a (the) dominant im-
pulse underlying business cycles if one wants to make such a claim.
Instead, he says he is "skeptical" about the entire parallel treatment454 Benjamin M. Friedman
of money and credit, arguing that empirical examination of business
cycle relationships is somehow legitimate for money but not for credit.
Meltzer motivates this presumption in favor ofmoney by appealing to
the quantity theory.
But what quantity? And what theory? The mere statement that the
growth of"money" bears a relation to income growth is no more than
a hypothesis subject to empirical testing. That people have believed in
it for many years would not make it so if the available empirical evi-
dence systematically contradicted it. Similarly, that people have be-
lieved in this relation for a long time does not, in the absence of evi-
dence, make it more valid than any other relation. A long tradition of
belief that money growth bears such-and-such a relation to income
growth also does not make it a "theory" in the sense ofa behavioral
explanation that is applicable to one observed relationship but not to
others.
To be sure, the theoretical literature provides many models of the
demand for money for transactions purposes, as well as ofthe demand
for asset holding. To justify Meltzer's presumption, however, it is nec-
essary to connect the theory to the quantity in question and also to
show that the theory does not connect to other quantities as well. In
an earlierera, Milton Friedman's "Restatement" ofthe quantity theory
explicitly defined money as claims "that are generally accepted in
payment of debts,"4 yet Friedman and Schwartz's empirical work fo-
cused on an aggregate also importantly including savings balances.
Today, neither Ml nor M2 readily corresponds with either the trans-
actions or the savings models of money demand, respectively. The
deposits included in Ml often serve a savings function, and these de-
posits and currency are hardly the only way to make payments anyway.
The more comprehensiveM2 certainlydoes notrepresenttotalfinancial
assets, or even total liquid assets.
Failing these conditions, the theory that is needed to relate any of
the familiar Ms to the business cycle is a more general theory describing
inside asset holding, and in particular a theory relating the holding of
inside assets to the determination of nonfinancial economic activity.5
4. Popular usage ofthe "quantity theory' idea notwithstanding, Friedman's "Restate-
ment" in no way provided a rationale for describing movements of income growth in
terms ofmovementsofmoneygrowthalone. Evenafterallofthe simplifyingassumptions
Friedman imposed, his final equation related nominal income not only to money but also
tointerestrates, equityreturns, therateofpriceinflation, theratioofhumanto nonhuman
wealth, and real income, in addition to any variables affecting tastes and preferences.
5. Models in which all assets are outside assets and (inside) liabilities do not exist
have been a staple ofmonetary economics for decades, and they have provided valuable
theoretical insights. But the world they describe corresponds to a modern economy only
ifthe inside assets and liabilities that obviously exist do not matter much. The empirical
evidence relating the monetary base to nonfinancial economic activity suggests that that
is not so in this context. The base does not show relationships to income that M1 and
M2 do not, and often the base shows weaker relationships than either Ml or M2.455 Money, Credit, and Interest Rates in the Business Cycle
As Tobin and others have shown, however, theories of inside asset
holding are inseparable from theories of inside liability issuing. Re-
gardless ofwhether credit is viewed as an aggregate ofdebt assets held
or an aggregate ofdebt liabilities issued, there is no reason to presume
that a satisfactory theory exists for M1 or M2 in isolation from other
inside assets and liabilities, or that a comprehensive theory of inside
asset holding and liability issuing would somehow point to a special
role for Ml or M2.
Whether there is something special about "money" in initiating or
propagating business cycles is an empirical question. The evidence
presented in my paper indicates that there is not.
Discussion Summary
Christopher Sims took issue with Allan Meltzer's claim that VARs are
particularly unrobust to specification changes by noting that, first, a
fortiori the same could be said of structural models. Second, while it
was true thattime series relationships change through time, the changes
were notenormous. Third, a standardofcomparisonwas neededbefore
one could claim that the relationships estimated were poorly captured.
Phillip Cagan observed that the NBER research on the relation be-
tween output and money had found that from the Civil War to the end
of the 1950s the qualitative evidence favored the view that variations
in the supply of money from various sources did affect output and
prices subsequently. This was not necessarily the case recently, since
Federal Reserve behavior might have shifted, but there remained the
question whether these changes affected the relationship between money
and GNP in an economically significant way.
Geoffrey Moore drew attention to the fact that money and credit
behavior is very different at the peaks and troughs of the cycle and
that one should not expect simple time series methods necessarily to
show stability over time. Stanley Fischer suggested a more general
hypothesis than the one in the paper, that persistent monetary expan-
sion is eventually followed by inflation. This, he said, seemed to be a
consistent qualitative result. Anna Schwartz took exception to Fried-
man's assertion in the paper that velocity is "only a ratio," which has
no relevance beyond that.
Benjamin Friedman stressedthatwhatwas importantfor the conduct
ofmonetary policy along "monetarist" lines was that relationships should
remain quantitatively stable and said he had shown that such stability
does not exist. While qualitative features ofthe money/nominal income
relationship might persist, these are oflimited use for policymakers.456 Benjamin M. Friedman
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